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INTRODUCTION 
Chastened and subdued to an overwhelming degree by the ceaseless and 
painful struggle to understand himself and his relation to the world in which 
he lives^ man has always been deeply concerned and justly mystified by the 
eternal problems of evil and suffering therein. In facing squarely the un¬ 
equivocal facts of evil in the world, misery in life, and the mystery of death, 
plus the realization that «man lives under something divine which partially 
2 
determines his actions," we have the essentials that made for the tragedy of 
existence which disturbed so profoundly the minds of Eugene O'Neill and the 
noble Greeks, his affinities. 
Schopenhauer in his book The World as Will and Idea states that "the 
life of every individual, if we survey it as a whole, and in general, and only 
lay stress upon its most significant feature, is really always a tragedy." If 
pondering the inner recesses of man's soul to find an answer as to why C-od 
sends suffering into the world can be the most "significant feature" mentioned 
by Schopenhauer, then we may share his belief that the life of every individual 
is a tragedy as proved in the plays of the noble Greeks and Eugene O'Neill in 
this study. 
The theme of Greek tragedy and thought may be summed up in Aeschylus' 
"Choephori" when the chorus, after viewing Orestes' empty semblance of vengeance 
in murdering his mother Clytemnestra, chants 
Alas, that none of mortal men 3 
Can pass his life untouched by pain; 
And again we find the breezes of life veering fitfully, according to Sophocles 
in "Oedipus Fex." After the noble Oedipus has discovered his unpardonable sin, 
Fred Millett and Gerald E. Bentley, The Art of the Drama (New York, 
1935), p. Hi. 
2 
Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill, Jr. (trans.), The Complete Greek 
Drama (New York, 1938), Introduction, p. xxviii 
3 
Aeschylus, "The Choephori," (trans.) Whitney J. Oates, op. cit«, p. 265. 
2 
"the sorest of all past ills encountering," the chorus cries 
Alas, ye generations of men, how mere a shadow do I count your life l 
Where, where is the mortal who wins more happiness than just the seeming, 
and, after the semblance, a falling away? Thine is a fate that warns me, 
 thine, thine unhappy Oedipus —— to call no earthly creature blest.1 
Thus we have in Greek thought, which is the same in essence as 
O'Neill's, the spectacle of man "let loose in a cosmic arena where the human 
2 
gladiator is foredoomed to fight a losing battle." It is this sense of the 
inevitability of life and its purposelessness, as O'Neill explains in "The 
Iceman Cometh," "All things are the same meaningless joke to me for they grin 
3 
at me from the one skull of death," that deepens man's questioning of his 
existence and causes him to search for meaning in this vast "blind momentum" 
called the universe. 
Since the beginning of time, man has attempted to represent the hopes 
and fears, the mystery of life and death and the ever-surging problem of evil 
by means of real or imaginary depiction of human life through the medium of 
the drama. Of the various dramatic forms, it is said that tragedy is the 
most exalted because it comes nearest the approximation of reality. 
Of the many and varied hypotheses as to the derivation of tragedy 
found by the writer, it seems expedient to finally settle on this one of 
Dr. Famell as modified by Professor Rose who remarked that 
We know very little of early Attic ritualj but if we suppose there 
existed some kind of rustic performance connected with Dionysus himself, 
or possibly with some similar god of fertility whom on his coming to Attic 
he absorbed, we can easily imagine that it involved a contest in which 
the power of fertility was for some reason killed (as deities of some 
kind very often are, to rise again with new vegetation of the next year, 
or the next^ crop of corn), or at least endangered by a formidable ad¬ 
versary. Summer fighting for his life against winter, possibly. The 
1 
^Sophocles, "Cedipus Rex," op. cit., p. b08. 
^Arnold Toynbee, "The Ancient Mediterranean View of Man" in Man's 
Fight to Knowledge, J. B. Brenner (ed.), (New York, 195b), p. 3. 
3Eugene O'Neill, "The Iceman Cometh," ed. John Gassner (New York, 
1952), p. 133. 
3 
chorus, quite possibly, wore goat skins as a disguise, chosen because of 
mythical lustiness and fertility of the he-goat : hence "tragedy" or 
"goat song". 
As has been suggested before, men were forever probing the causes of 
conflicts because ever present in life were the struggles of one force against 
another as indicated in the hypothesis of the origin of tragedy suggested by 
Professor Rose. In seeking an answer to his relation with hostile and un¬ 
seen forces, man realized that immanent in the universe were evil elements 
pitting their wiles against each other and man. The ancients portrayed these 
forces as Summer, the good force in nature, struggling against his ancient 
foe Winter, the evil force, who by the very unending cycles and rhythms of 
the seasons would crush Spring, thereby causing unavoidable misery to wretch- 
2 
ed mankind. It is not strange, then, that the idea of the origin of tragedy 
should have been at first joyous and religious in tone as well as religious 
in its worship of Dionysus, the god of wine and fertility which brought, for 
a time at least, happiness and abundance. The brevity and subsequent decay 
of Summer made for the mystery of life and its meaning to the ancients. 
That the struggle between Spring, the force of good, and that of 
Winter, the evil one, precluded the doomed downfall of Spring shows that in¬ 
herent in the primitive idea of tragedy was the sense of the inevitable so 
superbly expressed in the tragedies of the noble Greeks and in the works of 
Eugene O'Neill whose ideas as to the responsibility of man for the evil and 
its attendant suffering in the world are the basis for this study. 
Not only was Greek tragedy religious in origin and development, 
springing from a definite ritual, but is that the ritual on which 
Arthur Zeiger (ed.), Plays of the Greek Dramatists (Chicago, (n.dj ) 
Introduction, p. viii. 
2 
Gilbert Murray, Euripides and His Age (New York, 1913), pp. 59-78. 
h 
tragedy was based embodied the most f îrdamental conceptions of life and 
fate, of law and sin and punishment,! 
This implication of the inscrutability of human affairs, the responsibility 
of sin and punishment, and the very mystery of life itself led to a certain 
modicum of acceptance, if not complete resignation, Greek tragedy, as well 
as tragedy in the plays of Eugene O’Neill, is a partial resume* of man's in¬ 
vasion of the penetralia to place the blame for his unhappiness and his 
nevenceasing struggle to identify himself with an alien cosmos* 
Briefly then, tragedy is the spectacle of man struggling against 
the insuperables, either of inner conflicts of morality as primarily depicted 
in Greek tragedy or external circumstances, the essence of Necessity as 
portrayed by Eugene O'Neill* As the purpose of this essay is developed, we 
shall see "the spectacle of man sorely tried in the grip of Destiny ,,* with 
o 
a little of the divinity of those gods who make of him a plaything." 
Like that of the noble Greeks, O'Neill's "cosmic eye" was relent¬ 
lessly and endlessly seeking to "rend the veil of apparent reality" so that 
he could fix the blame for man's wretched lot on this earth. Doubt as to 
man's responsibility for his transgressions grew deeper as O'Neill desperate¬ 
ly tried to find harmony between man's propensity to sin and the exacting 
retribution of a pitiless universe. 
Both O'Neill and the "Tragic Three"   Aeschylus, Sophocles, and 
Euripedes, the tragedians used in this study -— were products of the ages 
in which they lived and naturally their concents were conditioned by their 
own experiences, O'Neill's attitude toward man's place and meaning in the 
1 
Donald C. Stuart, Development of Dramatic Art (New fork, 1933)j 
P. 11. 
2 
Sheldon Chaney, The Theatre; Three Thousand Years of Drama, 
Acting, and Stagecraft (NewTOTk7~T92977^— 
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universe was influenced by the rapid disintegration of moral principles 
following World War I, while the Greek view of man was colored by the 
collapse of Athenian society following the Peloponnesian War* Therefore, 
this study is a comparison of the Greek view of man and his responsibility 
for his own destiny with that of O'Neill's view of the same problem in 
which he places the responsibility for man's "bias toward evil" on the 
Doctrine of Necessity. 
This study is undertaken to ascertain whether O’Neill, in his view • 
of man expressed by the Doctrine of Necessity as suggested in his plays, 
conceived of man's possibility of redemption for his predilection toward 
evil as being within his own moral freedom or as being something external 
over which he had no absolute control. If there are other works which have 
already been done on the problem of responsibility exemplified in the Doctrine 
of Necessity in O'Neill's works or even in Creek tragedy, I am unaware and 
I hereby offer respectful apfcologies for any seeming resemblances. Dr. 
Rheinhold Niebuhr's The Nature and Destiny of Man, John Stuart Mill's A System 
of Logic, and the modern Russian philosopher, Nicolas Berdyaev's The Destiny 
of Man were my inspirations in addition to the plays of both the Greek 
tragedians and O'Neill. 
The first chapter of this study will deal primarily with the Greek 
view of man's responsibility for his sin and suffering. The representative 
works of each tragedian will be used. Because of the difference of expres¬ 
sions and nuances of interpretations, the writer used three different trans- 
lations which should not be confusing since they all bear the universal  
6 
meaning of the authors* In chapter II will be found O’Neill*s view of man*s 
accountability for evil and its attendant suffering in the lives of men* 
CHAPTER I 
THE GREEK VIEW OF MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY 
Often it has been revealed that though the instinct of all men is 
primarily concerned -with the nobler aspects of human nature rather than 
■with its "deviltries and calamities," it yet remains true that there is 
something in the very nature of the cosmic universe and of man that is allied 
■with the invisible force of evil."^ There is no escaping the fact that always 
there has been continuous suffering and its concomitant effects on the 
universe and man. 
Since the origin of Greek tragedy was religious, it is easy to see 
that persistent suffering as pictured in the tragedies would arouse the 
suspicion that there was "an evil force in the world." As tragedy is based 
upon the embodiments of the most fundamental conceptions of life and fate, 
2 
of law and sin and punishment, the whole trend of Greek thought in its most 
exalted form led men's contemplation of life's complexities and mysteries 
from an "external toward and internal conception of life,"^ in which they were 
finally convinced that nothing in nature was superior to man; consequently, 
man would endure passively the external evils which would ultimately lead to 
the positive creation of his own free will, the moral freedom to choose 
that which created his own destiny. Despite the Greeks' concept of the 
sovereignty of man’s will, there was always this perplexing questions Ythy is 
there sin in the world? 
If "no man willingly sins" as Plato avers in his "Republic," what 
then, is the cause or who is responsible for all the suffering of mankind? 
^Edwin Mims, Great Writers as Interpreters of Religion (New York, 
19h$), P. 62. 
^Gilbert Murray, p. 6l. - * 
■^William Chase Green, Moira late, lood and Evil in ureek Thought 
(Cambridge, 19W±), p. 109. 
7 
8 
Is it God or some unseen power, or is it man's own weaknesses that bring on 
his doom? Wherein does the responsibility lie? These are but a few of the 
disturbing questions men have asked themselves throughout an eternity of 
misery. 
Freedom of the Will? The Core of Man's Responsibility. During 
the sixth centurej E. C. Solon, an exalted embodiment of the true and noble 
Attic snirit of genius, appeared on the political and ethical horizon to 
help mould Greek thought relative to the responsibility of evil and to the 
extent that men share in the shaping of their own destinies. In Solon's new 
realm of thought, limited as it was by the primitive religions of mythology, 
he was not concerned primarily with the mere external trappings or blessings 
of the increasing materialism of the Greeks, but, rather, his preoccupation 
centered more on the inner compulsions of the spirit which determined 7/hether 
a man was good or not.'®' In one of his few extant poems, Solon is quoted as 
warning his fellow citizens against corrupt politicians; 
If you have suffered for your weakness, do not blame the godsl You 
yourselves allowed these men to grow great by giving them power, and 
therefore you have fallen into servitude. 
In railing at these people for their neglect and weakness in allow¬ 
ing a tyrant to become powerful, thereby causing suffering and disaster, 
Solon is placing the blame squarely upon the shoulders of those who suffered. 
It is obvious, then, that the ancient politician-poet anticipated later con¬ 
troversial Greek thought expounded by many philosophers and expressed by the 
incomparable triumvirate of tragedians, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. 
r - ——— 
Y/emer Jaeger, Paideia; The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert 
Highet (New York, 19^8), I, 1k3* 
2 
Ibid., p. H4. 
9 
This new pattern of Greek thought, now an integral part of Western man's 
culture, is embodied again in another of Solon's poems in which he tells 
the Athenians that 
Our city will not perish by the decree of Zeus and the counsel 
of the blessed gods immortal ... but the citizens themselves in their 
folly wish to ruin it by avarice.I 
This idea of man's responsibility for his sins is present in vary¬ 
ing degrees in the works of the "Tragic Three" which will be discussed 
later in more detail. In grappling with the all but insoluble problems 
of human destiny and mystery, the nobis Greeks believed fundamentally in 
the doctrine propounded by Solon that man himself, by virtue of his ability 
to think rationally and choose wisely, is accountable only to himself for 
his own misery. The essence of Greek philosophy, therefore, is that "the 
more freely and consciously men learn to guide their own thoughts, the more 
2 
inevitably they are brought face to face with the problems of destiny." 
According to the eternal laws of morality, the will is free and it 
is, therefore, subject to moral obligation. As the basis of this obligation 
is freedom, the will is free to turn from "the immutable good inherent in 
man and attach itself to the mutable good of externalities inherent in the 
universe, taking as its object either the goods of the soul ... or the 
goods of the body. The human will is, then, free to turn to God or away 
from God."^ To be sure, this is what Solon had in mind in his new area of 
thinking. Moreover, it is with comparative ease that we comprehend the 
infinite scope of Heraclitus’ idea that "a man's character is his fate,"^ 
the universal Greek concept of man's responsibility. 
1 
Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 11*3. 
2Ibid., p. 121*. 
3Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (London, 1950)» II» 
1*1*7. 
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In the theory of the '•dualism of the soul" set forth by Plato, the 
principle of a charioteer driving two ill-matched steeds finds credence in 
the assumption of a moral conflict between a higher and a lower self. The 
good self, of course, is the one which masters the higher self or the white 
steed, while the man without control of his will falls prey to the evil of 
retributive forces for riding the black steed. ^ The autonomy or self- 
mastery of the soul, according to Plato's "Republic" is the implication of 
the freedom of the will held by the "Tragic Three" as over against the 
Doctrine of Necessity embraced by Eugene O'Neill. 
Even as far back in antiquity as Homer, we find this same idea or 
concept of man's responsibility for his own destiny summarily stated in the 
"Odessy" when Zeus, contemplating the woes of mankind, speaks specifically 
about the "noble-hearted" Aegisthus, whom the son of Agamemnon, far-famed 
Orestes, slew. Thinking upon him Zeus spake out among the immortals:- 
Lo, you now, how vainly mortal men blame the godsi From us they 
say comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through blindness of 
their own hearts, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained.2 
Homer recognized, as we can see from this excerpt, that there must of 
necessity exist to some extent sin and suffering, but that through yielding 
to externalities which cause blindness of morality men tempt the fates to 
send more than their share. 
From this brief development of the idea of free will as a determi¬ 
nant of man's destiny, we can reservedly assume that Greek thought holds 
predominantly to the idea that God sends suffering into the world because 
foolish men are unable to bear with good grace "the two trials for every 
^William Chase Green, op. cit., p. 136. 
2Homer, The Odessy, trans. S. H. Butcher and Andrew Lang (New York, 
[n. dj , p.2. 
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boon1' meted out by the gods. Because of the "moral blindness" and human 
irresDonsibility, men suffer greater misery than the portion alloted them 
by heaven. It was not the intellectual error of yielding to "external 
seduction" with which the Greeks were universally concerned, but it was, 
more, the innate susceptibility of man's character to choose deliberately 
that which led to evil consequences. 
The Greeks were profoundly conscious that the goods of fortune 
are not only bestowed capriciously, but even when bestowed are not abso¬ 
lutely good, but depend for their value on the character of the recipient 
 " "Wherefore, 0 mortal men, why seek you abroad for your felicity, which 
is placed within yourselves?"^ 
And again we have the core of Greek philosophy echoed in St. 
Augustine's "Confessions." 
Where is the evil then, and whence, and how crept it hither? 
What is its root, and what is its seed? Or has it no being? Why then 
fear we and avoid what is not?2 
St. Augustine's answer to his own self-searching query is reminiscent of 
Greek thought and poetry. 
And I strained to perceive what I now heard, that free will was 
the cause of our doing ill, and thy judgement, of our suffering ill 
... I was most sure, that no other than myself did will and nill.3 
Hundreds of years later we find this same idea of the problem of responsi¬ 
bility reiterated in the words of another of the world's greatest thinkers 
as Cassius reminds Brutus that 
Men at some time are masters of their fatess 
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, 
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.^ 
•^•Frederick Copleston, op. cit., I, 83. 
2St. Augustine, The Confessions (Chicago, 19^8), Book VII, 113. 
3Ibid. 
hy.’illiam Shakespeare, Julius Caesar (New York, I9U6), p. 8l£. 
12 
By reason of shrewdness and self-discipline, the noble Greeks 
found justification for the presence of evil and suffering in the world. 
They insisted that the weakness of the emotions and of the body or, more 
broadly speaking, "the human passions are always characterized by unlimited 
and daemonic potencies of which animal life is innocent."^ Thus the Greeks 
ascribed to these passions much of the wrath from the gods. The observance 
of the "sanctity of holy things," so dear to the hearts of the jealous gods, 
enabled the Greeks to escape the inescapable ruin immanent in human existence 
as attested to in Aeschylus* "Agamemnon" when the chorus warns that: 
Who dares aver the Gods reck nought 
Of human actions when man flings 
The sanctity of holy things 
Beneath his feet?   an impious thought! 
The inordinate love of power and fame, overweening self-confidence, arrogance, 
pride, disrespect of the gods, and excess in all things were some of those 
"holy things" the Greeks held in abeyance in order to invite the favor of 
the gods or Tyche (Fortune). 
The essence of this view developed from the Greeks’ need to solve 
the contradiction of their being king in the universe and at the same time 
at the mercy of any fitful caprice and whim of the gods. There is this 
need to compensate for Plato's "dualism of the soul" in which both the 
forces of good and evil were constantly at variance with each other. These 
aspects of the Greek character, moderation and unbridled self-assertion, 
forever plagued the Greek mind to the extent 
Driven on by the will to power to self-destruction, the Greek 
1-Re inhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York, 1951), 
P. 179. 
^Aeschylus, op, cit,, p. 10. 
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creates the Olympian dream-^orld, the gods of which watch over him 
with jealousy to see that he does not transgress the limits of human 
endeavors So does he express his consciousness that the tumultuous 
forces in his soul would be completely ruinous of him. 
That instinct develops a feeling of an almost insurmountable 
barrier between man and the "Force"or God is shown in the assertion that 
the Greeks feared that any presumptuousness on their part in violating 
the "sanctity of holy things" would offend the gods who sent out "two 
trials for every boon," anyway. Long before the time of our "Tragic Three," 
Homer emphasized this fear of transgression in his "Illiad" wherein he 
states that there is nothing common to the race of the immortal gods and 
human beings. There again is the recognition that man is not in harmony 
with the Unknown and, so despite his freedom and sovereignty, he must walk 
in constant dread. It is when man assumes that his sovereignty surpasses 
that of the gods that he abrogates his freedom of the will and becomes the 
prey to any fitfully veering breeze of fate. So it is that in Greek thought 
the overstepping of the boundaries of "what is right and proper for man" 
and the self-willed violation of the "sanctity of holy things," honored of 
the gods, would result in ineluctable devastation for the "mere mortals" 
and "creatures of a day." 
Since the gods represent the forces of the cosmos, we can per¬ 
ceive in Greek thought an underlying principle of a law-governed universe, 
a universe that is no plaything of the mere caprice or lawless spontaneity. 
As interpreted by the writer, this is the basic difference between the 
Greek point of view which premises the philosophy that "man's fate is in his 
-'-Frank Copies ton, op. cit., I, 19. 
Ik 
character," and that of Eugene O'Neill, "whose works show that man's respon¬ 
sibility for sin lies essentially in the environment, circumstance, or 
heredity. 
Aeschylus: Staunch Defender of Divine Justice.   At the moment in 
history when, to all outward appearances, Greek civilization seemed to have 
attained its political and economical pinnacle, there arrived on the troubled 
horizon new disturbing forces of decline and decay, unimagined and incredible 
in the erstwhile glory of the world that was Greece. During the sixth cen¬ 
tury E. C., Greece was shaken by the fall of its ancient, unstable, and 
decadent aristocracy and with it much of its religious faith. There seemed 
to be a common longing for a new morality, a new concept to replace the 
crumbled faith of their fathers. These sixth century rumblings were har¬ 
bingers of greater changes to come. This was the century that was to 
"bring the marvelous fruit of tragedy to ripeness."^ 
The breakdown of Greek society, Athens especially, was, during the 
fifth century, merely the tangible portents of the collapse of the individual 
character so vividly limned in Sophocles' tragedies, lien were questioning 
the old concepts of mythology and its "sanctity of holy things." With the 
increase in her economic and political power at this time, Athens became 
immersed in a "calculating, dollars-and cents profiteering way of life." As 
to be expected, long years of fratricidal wars only accelerated the spread¬ 
ing depravity and demoralization of all the mental and spiritual principles 
which had always been the very foundation of Greek thought and life. 
Arnold J. Toynbee says that the Greek idea of man brought a brilliant  
^Werner Jaeger, op. cit., I, 339. 
1$ 
civilization into existence and that the same idea accounts for its strange 
1 
and tragic fate, a fate anticipated by the three great Athenian tragedians: 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. 
One of the surmises made by Aeschylus, the oldest of the "Tragic 
Three" and a staunch believer in the inevitable law of Nemesis, is that 
God sent suffering into the world to discipline men for their flagrant dis¬ 
regard of holy things and to deepen within them divine wisdom. In com¬ 
menting on and decrying the ever-increasing material splendor and preoccu¬ 
pation of Athens at the expense of moral and spiritual exuberance, Aeschylus 
attributed much of the sin and suffering to the untoward prosperity and 
power which he believed created in men an insolent and utter haughtiness 
and pride called by the Greeks "hybris." Athens in all her spoils of glory 
and fame had forgotten the toll men paid for their "hybris." In Aeschylus' 
"The Choephori," he warns the Athenians of the infallible law of retribution 
for sin caused by "hybris." 
Yet Justice is watching, to humble 
The haughty: her swift dooms smite 
Some at midnoon; some stumble 
On marches of darkness and light 
Ere the pang long evaded, that followed 
Aye turn their bliss into gall. 
As Aeschylus meditates upon the life of man as delineated in this seemingly 
infallible and pompous age of Greek magnificence he, a firm believer in 
justice, had a premonition that an irreparable doom was impending. 
Aeschylus was perpetually horrified by the realization of the 
cruelty of the blind impulses and passions that propelled the men of Athens 
^Arnold J. Toynbee, op. cit., p, 3 
^Aeschylus, "The Choephori", p. U5» 
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to their doom only to be punished finally for yielding to the passions. 
Of this he speaks in "Agamemnon:" 
Yet is man haled as with a chain, 
By scheming Ruin's resistless child, 
Tenptations, into sin beguiled. 
What cure avails? all, all are vainl 1 
Again in "The Mourners" or "The Choephori" he illustrates the perfidious¬ 
ness of this "ate/," or blind impulse, which led Orestes on to murder his 
mother Clytemnestra and her lover Aegisthus. 
And I -— the Gods have crushed me in the fall 
Of my far-off war-leaguered home, 
Have haled roe from my father's house, a thrall, 
Unto an evil doom. 
And I must brook the brutal recklessness  
My life is not mine to control ^ 
From this anguished cry of Orestes we can discern the working of Aeschylus' 
mind in saying this evil doom was not Orestes' to control, because somewhere 
in his existence he had succumbed to the human passion of revenge in killing 
his mother and her husband. Even if the idea were not his own, he allowed 
himself to be goaded into committing -the crime. It is the yielding to the 
compulsion of "ate/" or impulse that led to Orestes' doom, not merely the 
killing in itself, Aeschylus would have us deduce, then, that the very 
recognition of this loathing and its suppression show the reckless working 
of some weakness of character. That Orestes is struggling against the un¬ 
conquerable is evident here in the declaration that "my life is not mine 
to control." Orestes had forfeited his freedom of the will by the exercise 
of that very will. Although we know that the gods had preordained the 
^Aeschylus, op, cit., p. 11. 
2 
Ibid., p. U6. 
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curse on the House of Atreus, Aeschylus believes that Orestes was still 
responsible in large measure for his sin and suffering of remorse, because 
he bore the "taint" of this vengeance mission. Thus the problem of re¬ 
sponsibility was placed squarely on the shoulders of Orestes without his 
being fully aware of his part in his own destiny. 
As he tried to solve the insoluble puzzle of "life's moral tangles," 
Aeschylus' belief was that suffering is God's discipline for men. When he 
viewed the impending destruction of Athenian society, he was convinced that 
only through suffering would the Greeks find redemption and become more 
disciplined and cognizant of the laws of justice and life. In "Agamemnon" 
he employs this thought to prepare us for the suffering decreed by the fates 
to fall on the House of Atreus. As Clytemnestra and Aegisthus perfect their 
plans to murder Agamemnon who has sacrificed Iphigenia to placate the ire 
of the gods, the chorus warns that 
Zeus unto men the path of wisdom showeth: 
This as the law of life doth he ordain  
'From suffering's root the flower instruction groweth.1 
Yet even in sleep the heart only sees pain.^ 
To justify the ways of God to man, Aeschylus pictures Agamemnon as 
a haughty, glory-loving individual on the one hand and a devoted father and 
husband on the other. But when it comes time to make a heart-rending choice 
he yielded to ate and chose the path of his own doom. Here we see Agamemnon 
struggling in the throes of the moral tangle of his own free will. 
In dark despair the elder King spake, crying, 
Woe to me if I do not her command1. 
Yet, oh, to see mine house's darling lying 
^Ibid., p. 6. 
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Upon the altar, and upon mine hand 
The life-streams of a slaughtered maiden dyeing 
A father’s fingersl wretched choice for me! 1 
Ostensibly, this freedom of the will put a heavy burden upon the Greek 
conscience because Agamemnon is wholly aware of the enormity of the con¬ 
sequences of his action under either choice. The next few lines of the 
same play indicate how the reckless working of something in the character 
held him accountable for his own guilt and suffering. His was the chance 
to make a choice even though treacherous impulse was driving him on to his 
doom. As Agamemnon wrestled with the two daemons of choice, his black 
steed ruled him into bowing to the demands of his love of power, glory, 
and fame in preference to the nobler love of his child. Notice how he 
rationalizes: 
let how forsake the ships, like recreant flying? 
How forfeit all this great confederacy? 
Therein lay the weakness of his character and the cancerous core corroding 
the vitals of Athenian morality and thought the veneration of the 
externalities symbolized in the human passions. Agamemnon’s tragic flaw 
was the fact that he was unable to forfeit ’’all this great confederacy,” the 
center of Athenian depravity, even for the life of "mine house's darling." 
As the chorus continues we learn that " he stooped ’neath the yoke of 
fate’s compulsion." This capitulation to the almost irresistible seduc¬ 
tion of ate7 began the vicious cycle of the vindication of the moral law 
of Fate voiced by the chorus. 
The next example of this over-stepping of the boundaries of human 
1Ibid* 
19 
activity is shown in "The Choephori" in which Agamemnon, who paid for his 
crime by death, is being avenged. Always the chorus as a sort of conscience 
warned the actors who were informed of the natural outcome of their crimes, 
Orestes and Electra were warned by the chorus as they became more and more 
distracted over the murder of their father and the vengeance which they 
plotted. 
Ever the tongue of hate shall the tongue of hate requite 
Aye for the stroke of murder the stroke of murder shall smite. 
Justice exacting her dues cries ringing-voiced this law, 
'Doers must suffer' —so sayeth the immemorial saw.^ 
"Doers must suffer" was warning enough to balance the choice that Electra 
and Orestes had to make about the vengeance of their father. If this retri¬ 
bution of "doers must suffer" seems excessive,Aeschylus reminds us that 
" sin begets sin," the wages of which are death. This is the eye for an eye 
philosophy of biblical times, but by the strange and baffling compulsion 
of fate Orestes was powerless to abide by the immemorial saw that said 
"doers must suffer," This is truly the heart of Greek tragedy and of all 
Greek pessimism. It was mortifying and depressing to realize that in 
spite of all the superior qualities man had within his potentialities, he 
was still less than a football kicked around at will. It was this perplex¬ 
ing repudiation of sovereignty and thralldom that helped to undermine Greek 
ascendancy 
Before the blood was barely dried from the murders of his mother 
Clytemnestra and her lover Aegisthus, imp. la cab le retributive forces were 
under way, for Orestes' mind was fast deteriorating as he fancied he saw 
^Aeschylus, "The Choephori", op, cit., p. $1. 
p 
^Arnold J. Toynbee, op, cit,, pp, 2-11, 
20 
queer shapes, these "Handmaid women, there in Gorgon guise. They came in 
with sable robes and with their hair entangled with snakes." Orestes was 
implored by the chorus to go to Loxias in order to free his conscience from 
the ravages of his mind. Aeschylus here points up Toynbee's statement that 
man is in a universe in which he has no other master than himself (his own 
free will); notwithstanding, "man is still the human gladiator foredoomed 
to fight a losing battle because the course of the universe is meaningless 
and merciless."^ 
The Furies brought to Orestes the punishment of the gods for his 
crime and sin for which he, according to Greek thought, was essentially 
responsible through his own moral blindness. The chorus of "The Choephori" 
asked how could the plagues on the House of Atreus be termimated; the res¬ 
olution came in the form of Aeschylus' justification of Orestes' madness and 
his intense desire to atone for an evil he had perfidiously been driven to 
believe right. In "The Eumenides" or "The Reconciliation" Aeschylus had 
this to say, a statement that thinking Athenians deemed as a well-timed 
portent, that 
* Tis good that Fear yet lingering midst nations 
Somewhere should watch man's soul 
Throned in conscience, good that tribulations 
Should teach man self-control. 
■Who, if he nurture not a spirit humble, 
When all his path is bright, 
Who — be it state or man — can choose but stumble 
From reverence for Right? 
Envy not the freedom that defieth 
Control, nor that slave-life which cowering lieth 
A tyrant's footstool:2 
^Ibid., p. 2. 
2 
Aeschylus, "The Euminides", op. cit., p. 83. 
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It seems to me that Aeschylus is warning the Athenians that this "conscious 
deification of human power" was not as infallible as the Greeks tried to 
make themselves believe and that when man has a vaunted freedom of the will, 
which through sin he loses control, then this freedom is meaningless. He 
warns them that fear and conscience and reverence for right should guide 
men and any deviations "when all his path is bright" bring on the ultimate 
justice of heaven retribution. Also he warned that "godlessness when it 
conceiveth brings arrogance to birth," 
But child of wholesome soberness of spirit 
Fair fortune is, which all men may pray to inherit. 
In his high-minded piety Aeschylus added that blind passion brought only 
the ire and vengeance of the gods not jealous but outraged, but that 
He who of his free will 
Doth righteoudness, shall still 
Be blest: no surge of ill 
Shall whelm him under: 
But he who overleaps 
Justice, Whose dragnet sweeps 
In heaps confused on heaps 
Unhallowed plunder, 
He shall perforce at last 
Lower his sail, when mast 
And yard by trouble's blast 
are riven asunder. 
The struggle between evil and good for possession of the soul of Orestes 
has now been resolved in hie hopes of a new order in which men may be com¬ 
plete masters of themselves and find harmony in the universe. This is 
stated as the chorus exhorts 
The all-seeing lord, even Zeus, for Pallas' nation 
To bring the new fair age to birth 
 With Fate allied, hath stooped to earthl  
^Ibid., p. 8ii 
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So Aeschylus* answer to the question "whence the evil in life?" 
seems to be in man's own freedom to choose, but when man abuses this 
freedom because of some innate weakness of the will causing a hardening 
of character, then his ruin is inescapable. By self-discipline, moder¬ 
ation, repentance, and reverence for divinity, men may circumvent the dangers 
immanent in the universe which is contemptuous of the self-sufficiency 
of man. This idea of rationalization and of self-discipline to counter¬ 
act the wrath of the gods and thus escape disaster runs through all of 
Greek tragedy. 
Sophocles: Character and Man's Destiny.—- If it were possible at 
all to make a capsule appraisement of so vastly meaningful a philosophy as 
that encompassed in Sophocles' works, the writer would select with pains¬ 
taking discrimination these lines as Sophocles' answer to the problem of 
responsibility for sin and suffering in the world: "A man's character is 
his destiny; the responsibility lies with him who chooses; God is blameless."1 
Ibis, it is indicated, is the center of Greek thought especially validated 
by Sophocles. 
The force of dramatic action in the tragedies of Sophocles is "the 
importance of the individual character in his struggle with opposing 
characters or with circumstance caused by some kind of internal conception 
2 
of life having to do with moral freedom of the will." While Sophocles 
lived in the same post-war tempo as Aeschylus and Euripides, his life 
spanning the period of Athenian ascendancy, it is said that his works bear 
-*-J. T. Sheppard, op. cit., p. 185# 
^Ibid., p. 186. 
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little of the religious fervor and inprints of the results of this age of 
expansive moral and spiritual changes. Nevertheless, we do know generally 
that during this "Golden Age" of Periclean Athens men were venturing for 
the first time on the arduous and compelling tasks of trying deliberately 
to develop human character in accordance with the cultural ideals of their 
new society, soon to be immortalized in the works of Plato and Aristotle, 
If we were to extract from the various Greek meanings one comprehen¬ 
sive element preponderant in the works of Sophocles, it would be that of 
* 
"sophrosyne," that compendium of proportion, balance, harmony, and modera¬ 
tion that was the basis of the meaning of all Greek life. From a casual 
reading of the histoiy of Greek civilization, one can appreciate this idea 
of "sophrosyne^" or the idea that proportion is one of the supreme human values. 
This ides of "sophrosyne^' can be discerned in Sophocles' characterization, 
the "ineffaceable impression" he seems to leave on his dramas. In this im¬ 
pression Sophocles has contrived to embody idealism and nobility of character 
at its highest level of attainment. Sophocles' presentations of his character 
are not essentially as they are, but as they "ought to be" in line with the 
Greek concept of an intellectual striving to find the true nature of the 
psyche*. 
Sophocles' position on man's responsibility may be found in his 
peerless characterizations which were the inspiration for Aristotle's famous 
definition of the tragic hero (Poetics, XIII), "a man who is highly renowned 
and prosperous, but one who is not preeminently virtuous and just, whose 
misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice and depravity, but by 
"Vemer Jaeger, op. cit., p. 270. 
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some error of judgment or frailty." To Sophocles, man himself was the most 
important element in this timeless conflict between man and God. In com¬ 
menting upon man and his place in a belligerent universe, Sophocles made 
this penetrating observation on the dignity and nobility of man as the chorus 
sings in "Antigone" 
Much is there passing strange 
Nothing surpassing mankind. 
who is the creator of all the arts, is the sovereign of nature by virture of 
his creative mind, and has learned the best of all arts that of building 
a state. Man has excelled in every sphere of human endeavor, but despite all 
of his majesty and nobility of soul, man has found no refuge from the tomb. 
In working out his own destiny according to his dignity and the 
power of his own free will 
Now he bends to the good, now to the ill, 
With craft of art, subtle past reach of sight: 
Wresting his country's laws to his own will.2 
Such is the majesty of man's existence on the earth, now up, now down, ad¬ 
justing himself to his country's demands by the exigencies of his own free 
will. His lot is endurable as long as he is aware that even though "there 
is nothing surpassing mankind" his sovereignty is meaningless and in his 
Spuming the sanction of celestial light 
High in the city, he is made city-less, 
Whoso is corrupt, for his impiety. 
He that will work the works of wickedness « 
let him not house, let him not hold with mel 
This fundamental aspect of Sophocles' philosophy is more clearly 
apparent in "Antigone," a tragedy in which we find one of the most noble 




"exaltations of human worth and dignity in all literature." That Antigone's 
tragedy was a result of her own wilfulness is evident throughout the play. 
It was the unpardonable sin of defying the inviolable city laws that precip¬ 
itated Antigone's doom. There is no miscalculating Sophocles' stand on the 
issue as is disclosed in the intrepid Antigone's answer as to why she flouted 
Creon's law. She disobeyed it 
Because it was not Zeus who ordered it, 
Nor Justice, a dweller with the Nether Gods, 
Gave such a law to menj nor did I deem 
Your ordinance of so much binding force 
As mortal man could overbear 
The unchangeable, unwritten code of Heavenj 
This is not of today and yesterday, 
But lives forever, having origin 
Whence no man knows? whose sanctions I were loath 
In Heaven's sight to provoke, fearing the will 
Of any man.-*- 
In the avowal that the unwritten code of Heaven is not of today and yesterday, 
but lives forever, Sophocles is admitting that he believes in a mysterious 
and powerful Force beyond the universe, though its laws are infinitely in¬ 
comprehensible » 
"Wonders are many" and, to Sophocles, "none is more wonderful than 
man" until by his own weakness or rashness of character he dwells with sin. 
It is this sense of the inevitable that pervades the whole play as we see 
that by her own stubbornness and independence Antigone tempts destiny. The 
next two speeches give rise to a mounting sense of doom as we learn from 
the chorus exactly why Antigone must suffer. The iirst leader says of 
Antigone who has defied Creon and all his laws 
Ibid., p. 109 
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Lo you, the spirit stout 
Of her stout father's child — unapt to bend 
Beneath misfortune.1 
The Athenian audience must have quaked to hear such condemnation of Antigone 
and when Creon threatened her with 
But be well assured, 
Tempers too stubborn are first to fail 
The hardest iron from the furnace, forged 
To stiffness, you may see most frequently 
Shivered and broken; and the chafing steeds 
I have known governed with a slender curb. 
the audience must have shuddered. The unbending stubbornness of her 
character prepares us for the retribution that was to come for this trans¬ 
gression of the boundaries of human propriety. 
The quality of "sophrosyne*," or moderation and balance in all things, 
is that quality whose metaphysical basis was the core of the Greek view of 
life. This element, so integral a part of Sophocles' works, epitomizes in 
broad measure Sophocles' answer to the everlasting question "What is the 
meaning of sin and why does God send suffering into the world?" It seems 
to me that no where else in his tragedies does Sophocles made transparent 
his meaning of balance, proportion, and harmony of character as it relates 
to man’s responsibility of sin than in the speech of the chorus just after 
Antigone and Ismene have been sentenced to death. 
Thy power, 0 God, what pride of men 
constraineth 
Which neither sleep, that all things else enchaineth, 
Nor even the tireless moons of Heaven destroy? 
Thy throne is founded fast 
High on Olympus, in great brilliancy, 




Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 277. 
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Through present and through future and through past 
Abideth one decree; 
Nought in excess _ 
Enters the life of man -without unhappiness. 
/ 
Here in its implicit entirety do we have this element of "sophrosyne," the 
root of all evil. It is this law of proportion and balance, moderation 
and harmony so characteristic of the best Greek sculpture and of all of 
Sophocles1 dramas that goes to the origin of the Greek concept of evil 
and man's responsibility for his own destiny. Nothing in excess, whether 
of temper, of pride, of fame or glory, enters the life of man without his 
having paid dearly for this imbalance and disproportion of character. 
Proportion and harmony and balance are, as Sophocles and the Greek sculp- 
O 
tors exhibited, the highest value in human life. While to many men 
excess may at first seem desirable, the chorus reminds us that it 
... to many a mind 
Proves but mockery of its wild desires. 
They know not aught nor fear, 
Till their feet feel the pathway 
strewn with fires. 
"If evil good appear, 
That soul to his ruin is divinely led"— 
(Wisely the word was said!) 
And short the hour 
He spends unscathed by the 
avenging power.3 
The "evil good" may be in many forms of excessiveness — of temper and 
stubbornness characteristic of both Creon and Antigone, but for the briefest 
space does he who dwells in excess fare free of woes. 
Of every Sophoclean character, because of his "ineffaceable impres¬ 
sion," it is never difficult to find the pulse of the essential agony of 
^"Sophocles, op. cit,t p. 113. 
^Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 2?8, 
3sophocles, op. cit., p. 111;. 
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character that precludesfcioom inevitable. In Creon's almost fanatical and 
excessively stubborn adherence to the strictest interpretation of the mutable 
laws of the state over and above the immutable laws of Heaven, we find this 
tragic and essential agony when Creon learns of the suicide of both his wife 
and his son. Ill counsel and obstinacy have caused these evils to enmesh 
Creon. As the Messenger relates the events that led to the death of Creon's 
son, he reveal^s other Sophoclean aspects of the lack of "sophrosyne/n in the 
lives of the Greeks in that 
... his misery 
Is witness to mankind what worst a woe 
The lack of counsel brings a man to know. 
"Of all the curses which cleave to man, ill counsel is the sovereign curse" 
because it deprives mankind of the proper proportions and balance, the guid¬ 
ing principle of all existence in which man is reverently aware of that 
justice which is implicit in everything and which can be realized only at 
2 
the fulness of spiritual maturity. 
To Creon at last in the fulness of his maturity gained at a very 
dear cost comes the shocked realization that it was also his innate stubborn¬ 
ness that caused much of the suffering depicted in "Antigone." It is 
Sophocles' answer to the perennial question of man's accountability for sin 
and suffering as the chorus announces that 
Lo, now, Creon himself draws near us 
Clasping a record 
Manifest, if we sin not, saying it, 
Of ruin unwrought by the hands of others,. 
Eut fore-caused by his own self-will, 
jlbid.» p. 130. 
werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 279. 
•^Sophocles, op. cit,, p. 130. 
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This strange fusion of character and fate has the power to teach men that 
in knowing themselves and in acknowledging their weaknesses of character 
or judgment, they must of necessity recognize the shadowy nothingness of 
reality and their powerlessness in fulfilling their destinies. Through 
suffering brought on by the intrinsic agony of character, Creon recognizes 
at last the fulfilling of his destiny as being inevitable and insoluble. 
When his cup of woe is over-run by the announcement that his wife had 
stabbed herself, Creon rises to the height of nobility in his grief-stricken 
confession: 
Woe is me I to none else can they lay it, 
This guilt, but to me! 
I, I was the slayer, I say it. 
Unhappy, of theeI 
"Woe for the sins of a darkened soul, stubborn sins, fraught with death ... 
Woe is me for the wretched blindness of my counsels! Woe is me — thy 
2 
spirit hath fled, not by thy folly, but mine own!" 
As Creon, "a rash, foolish man" whose lack of proper balance, 
harmony, and proportion "sophrosyne*" caused his downfall, is conducted into 
the palace after Ms wife's tragic end, the chorus discloses another facet 
of sin and responsibility held by Sophocles. 
Wisdom is the supreme part of happiness; reverence toward the gods 
inviolate. Great words of prideful men are ever punished with great 
blows, and, in old age, teach the chastened to be wise.3 
To comprehend the vast implication of Creon's self-searching and Ms 
recognition of Ms own excessive rashness is to plumb the depth of this 
quality of "sophrosyne/," the highest value in human life, according to Greek 
pMlosophy.  
•[•Ibid., p. 132. 
2 Ibid. 
3Sophocles, "Antigone," trans. Whitney J. Oates, op. cit., p. h$9• 
30 
Sophocles’ "Electra" demonstrates vividly this noble quality of 
’’sophrosyne" when Electra soundly berates the Gods for her wretched lot on 
this earth and for the seeming futility of all her plans for wreaking 
vengeance on the murderers of her father Agamemnon. There is an unmistak¬ 
able suggestion of improper balance in Electra’s character as the chorus 
exhorts her to have 
Courage, my daughter, courage; great still in heaven is Zeus, who 
sees and governs allt forget not they foes but refrain from excess of 
wrath against them.-*- 
Sophocles reiterates here his philosophy that chaos and uncertainty brought 
on by excess will surely disappear when man refrains from the evils of excess 
in any area of human affairs. This exhortation of ’’excess in nought" points 
up Sophocles' concept of balance and proportion as basic elements in attain¬ 
ing the fulness of spiritual maturity that aids in man's redemption for 
causing suffering in the world. 
In all of the plays of Sophocles we discern a firm conviction that 
even though the "psychei" was the center of man's life, the divine will of the 
Gods ultimate held complete sway over human affairs even though men bore the 
heavier burden for shaping their own destinies. This conviction may be 
suggested by the Guard's statement when he is telling Clytemnestra of the 
details of Orestes’ supposed death in "Electra." Even as Orestes was cn the 
verge of seaming victory, the tides turned and he was killed, or so thought 
the Guard who reminded the audience that "all that glistens is not gold," 
all may be well apparently 
1Ibid., p. 508. 
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But if some Deity is bent on harm _ 
It is not even a strong man can escape. 
We come again to Sophocles1 belief that there is some power, "having 
origin whence no man knows" that directs man's destiny. Sophocles' answer to 
the everlasting "why" seems that the soul moves men to act and by their very 
own actions they lure the"ate" or blind impulse that leads them on to their 
doom. Sophocles restates this principle again and again as we see it advanced 
in his moving tragedy "The Trachiniae," reminiscent of Euripides' "Medea." 
This is the tragedy of a wife who unwittingly kills her husband Heracles by 
sending him a poisoned robe. Medea, as it were, deliberately murders her 
husband, while Deianeira was duped and beguiled into slaying hers. 
After learning that Heracles had overcome the most insuperable of 
all tasks to save Greece, he is now completely vanquished by the beauty and 
love of a young girl. Deianeira perceives utterly her helplessness in this 
strange situation. However penetrating the pangs of sorrow are, Deianeira 
knows that 
They are not wise, then, who stand forth to buffet against love; 
for Love rules the gods as he will, and me; and why not another woman, 
such as I am? So am I mad indeed, if I blame my husband because that 
distemper hath seized him. 
So as Deianeira shows the agony of a soul rationalizing and seeking to 
justify the ways of God to nan, we grasp something of the clarification of 
Sophocles' concept of man's part in shaping his own destiny. In the first 
place, we are moved with apprehension for Heracles because Deianeira 
divulges the fact that a "distemper" hath seized him," and in the second 
instance, we find Deianeira confiding to her friend that 
p. V?6 
hbid., p. 509. 
2Sophocles, "The Trachiniae',' trans. Whitney J. Oates, op. cit.t 
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Indeed mine own thought^noves me to act thus. Trust me, I will 
not add a new affliction to* my burdens by waging a fruitless fight 
against the gods. 
This speech is the re-echo of Toynbee*s idea that man is let loose in a 
cosmic arena where he is foredoomed to fight a losing battle. This un¬ 
accountable contradiction of man’s sovereignty and his powerlessness moved 
Sophocles to meditate upon "the fruitless fight against the gods.” There 
is a dignity and nobility of character suggested here that even though 
Deianeira confronted the hopelessness of her doom as a cast-off wife, she 
was loathe to yield without a vestige of a struggle. Remembering the magic 
robe given to her by the dying centaur Nessus who advised her to use it only 
to win back her husband's love, Deianeira's actions proved that while it is 
not expedient to wage war with necessity, it is neither noble to accept 
passively the unavoidable suffering sent by God into the world. Sophocles, 
it seems, had little sympathy for passive endurance of evils from the 
2 
external source of human passions. 
Heracles' suffering, we are led to divine, resulted directly from 
the improper balance of his character in which the distemper of love had 
caused him to create disharmony and chaos in his own life. 
"Philoctetes" is another great tragedy in which the problem of 
accountability is explored to great depths by Sophocles. Here we have a 
valiant warrior exiled because of his participation in a battle and being 
destroyed later by a friend whom he needed more than anything else. Briefly, 
the essential agony of Philoctetes' character lies deeply imbedded in his 
implacable hatred of his foe and his rashness in expressing this passion. 
1Ibid.1 p. 478. 2'terner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 279. 
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Even though he died before the fall of Athens, Sophocles had a 
premonition that some adverse fortune impended because of the excessive 
glorification of materialism, a violation of " sophrosyne*" that always por¬ 
tended evil consequences. A sense of that portentous mood may be experi¬ 
enced when Philoctetes begs Neoptolemus, his new-found friend,to take him 
away from the lonely island of his exile as he comments on the state of 
man's existence 
Think, my son, how frail 
And full of danger the state of man  
Now prosperous, now adverse. Who feel no ills 
Should therefore fear them; and when fortune smiles 
Be doubly cautious, lest destruction come 
Remorseless on him, and he fall unpitied. 
From the depth of despair spring these words of wisdom coming from 
Philoctetes who, despite this semblance of spiritual sagacity, found it al¬ 
most impossible to forgive his foe. When Philoctetes had a chance to for¬ 
give his enemies thereby bringing surcease of misfortune in his own life, 
he refused. For this weakness of character we hear this stinging denuncia¬ 
tion coming from Neoptolemus who says 
Misfortune, which the gods 
Inflict on mortals, they perforce must bear: 
But when, oppressed by voluntary woes, 
They make themselves unhappy, they deserve not 
Our pity or our pardon. Such art thou, 
Thy savage soul, inpatient of advice, 
Rejects the wholesome counsel of thy friend, 
And treats him as a foe ... 
The voluntary woes which oppressed Philoctetes were those of his own choice 
at this time, because as Philoctetes himself recalls 
^-Sophocles, "Philoctetes',' op. cit.t p. 602 
2Ibid., p. 602. 
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... for well I know 
Whence once the mind's corrupted it brings 
Unnumbered crimes forth, and ills to ills succeed.1 
So again we have the recurring refrain in Greek thought that evil begets 
evil and that it wells originally from man's bitterness of soul and his 
own unyielding defiance of the gods who scorn any untoward exhibition of 
these negative qualities. 
In reviewing Man's predilection for sin and his own responsibility 
for its consequences, Sophocles directs the chorus in advancing this point 
of view 
Unhappy manI 
Thou hadt provoked thy fate; thyself alone 
Art to thyself a foe, to scorn the good, 
Which wisdom bids thee take, and choose misfortune. 
Thus it is again that we have fairly accurate assurance that in Greek 
thought the will is free to scorn or accept the immutable good. It is 
wisdom that impels man to seek the highest good in life, this wisdom being 
identified naturally with the psyche wherein lies the essence of the nature 
of man. From the violent temper of Philoctetes who bursts into a tirade the 
very moment his friend's intentions were known, Sophocles makes a reassur¬ 
ing case against Philoctetes' misuse of "sophrosyne" in his immature dis¬ 
play of excessive passion. 
Near the end of his fury, Philoctetes seems to perceive the inanity 
of his eruption, yet he still refuses to acknowledge his responsibility for 
his suffering. The chorus solicitously advises Philoctetes to remember that 
it was the gods themselves who decreed his cruel fate. If he would refrain 
^-Ibid., p. 603 
2Ibid., p. 593 
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from spending his strength calling down the wrath of the gods on the heads 
of his enemies, he would soon find favor with more propitious gods and 
fortune. Ignored almost completely by Philoctetes who is engrossed in his 
own welfare, the chorus reminds the inflexible Philoctetes that 
Justice will ever rule the good man's tongue, 
Nor from his lips reproach and bitterness 
Invidious flow.l 
Even this mild rebuke fails to check the over-welling sharpness of his 
despair as the chorus adds 
Observe, my lord, what bitterness of soul 
His words express; he bends not to misfortune, 
But seems brave. 
Portentous words these! The immensity of Philoctetes' woes seems to gain 
in momentum as hinted in Neoptolemus' reminder to Philoctetes to 
let not misfortune thus transport thy soul 
To rage and bitterness.3 
because he knows that evil merely begets evil and that only by yielding his 
hitherto inflexible will to that of fate would his fortunes be changed. 
When Neoptolemus has just about given up hope of aiding Philoctetes in re¬ 
lenting, he at last sees signs of Philoctetes' succumbing to reason. His 
better part of wisdom gains supremacy over his self-pity as with the 
heart-rending confession of his own stubbornness of spirit, he consigns 
himself to fate inevitable in these noble but soul-searing words? 
Then let me suffer: 
Suffer I must.^ 
Sophocles is again emphasizing the insolubility of man's existence 
and the inevitability of suffering in the universe. All of Philoctetes' 
llbid., p. 593* 
2Ibid., p. 59b• 
3Ibid. 
^Ibid.. p. 605. 
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sufferings may be directly traced to some "reckless working" of his will. 
His physical suffering was due specifically to his "rash approach" to the 
fell serpent on Chrysa's shore, while his moral suffering was the result of 
his remorse. Suffering, in one manner or another, is man's reward for having 
been born. The ways of heaven and the gods defy justification; the inscru¬ 
tability exists and that is all. 
The final redemptive bending of Philoctetes' will to good as a solu¬ 
tion to the problem of sin and suffering in the world was solved by the in¬ 
troduction of Heracles as the deus ex machine, explained as the personifica¬ 
tion of the conscience of Philoctetes which prompted his change of heart. 
It has been said that "those whom the gods love die young." Since 
age and decay were once considered evils from the gods, that particular 
comment stands upon plausibility. Sophocles, however, was an old man when 
he wrote "Oedipus at Colonus," the story of the high-hearted Oedipus first 
introduced in "Oedipus Rex."’ His ideas as to the relation between age and 
suffering is absorbing when one recalls that Sophocles himself died at the 
very mellow age of ninety, a record even in this day of geriatrics. 
After Theseus had promised Oedipus sanctuary from long years of woe- 
ridden exile, Antigone, who had led her blind father in all his travels, 
pleads with her stubborn father to relent in his unforgiving attitude against 
his son Polynices who has made many overtures at reconciliation. Antigone 
tells her father to recall his past, so well-known to students of Greek 
tragedy in "Oedipus Rex," in order to conceive just "how evil is the end 
that awaits on evil wrath." She begs him to reconcile his hardness toward 
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his son because evil only begets evil. As old Oedipus1 adamantine stubborn¬ 
ness finally surrenders to his daughter's fervent pleading, -ne hear the 
chorus echoing Sophocles' comment on age as a contingent of suffering. In 
this observation there is also a suggestion of "sophrosyne#r" 
■Whoso craves the ampler length of life, not content to desire a 
modest span, him -will I judge with no uncertain voice; he cleaves to 
folly. For the long days lay up full many things nearer unto grief 
than joy; but as for thy delights, their place shall know them no 
more, when a man's life hath lapsed beyond the fitting term.l 
"Those whom the gods love die young...any moderately intelligent man who 
has reached the age of forty has experienced everything that has been and 
2 
is to be." This is the brooding view of man as held by the noble Greeks 
in general. 
While he is master of everything in the universe, man is still aware 
of the brevity of life and the inconsequentiality of human beings, after all. 
He knows, too, as the chorus sings in "Oedipus at Colonus" that "the best 
fate for a human being is never to have been born" for even after possess¬ 
ing all the wisdom, nobility, and worth, the course of the universe is still 
meaningless, especially in old age. To be sure, it is something of a viola¬ 
tion of "sophrosyne7" to live too long. Witness the reply of the chorusr 
Not to be born is, past all prizing, best; but, when a man hath seen 
the light, this is next best by far, that with all speed he shall go 
thither, whence he hath come. For when he hath seen his youth go by, 
with its light follies, what troublous affliction strange to his lot, 
what suffering is not therein ... age, dispraised, infirm, unsociable, 
unfriended, with whom all woe of woe abides.^ 
like Sophocles, Oedipus lived a long life beset by the harried, afflictions 
old age. Just as the Oracle prophesied, Oedipus found sanctuary in Attica. 
-^-Sophocles, "Oedipus a Colonus", trans. Whitney J. Oates, op. cit., 
p. 65U. 2 
^Arnold J. Toynbee, op, cit., p. 1*. 
^Sophocles, op. cit., p. 65U> 
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"Strange and incomprehensible as the road of suffering along which the gods 
have led him is the miracle of release which he finds at the end."-*- As we 
rejoice to see an end to Oedipus' suffering in his mysterious disappearance, 
the chorus offers this explanation: 
... For ' tis not mine to say that a decree of heaven is ever vain: 
watchful, aye is Time, overthrowing some fortunes, and on the morrow 
lifting others, again to honour. 
Unfathomable are the ways of man's existence on the earth. No mor¬ 
tal eye may divine the mystery of God's ways to man: only he who is conse¬ 
crated by suffering may be a part of the eternal dilemma of man's place in 
the universe. Yet those who are dedicated may never hope to resolve the 
insoluble forces behind sin and suffering in the world in which man is king 
and yet he is also a thrall. 
Euripides: First Prober of the Psyche.   Just as O'Neill was a 
symbol of his age representing the "lost generation," so was Euripides a 
child of his times representing the era "era of enlightment" in which the 
manners and morals in economic and political life found immortal expression 
in his dramas. Athens, at this time the most famous of all the institutions 
of city-states, was just emerging from the toils of the Peloponnesian War 
which had left it in a state of unrest, uncertainty, and chaos. The coldly 
"calculating economic and political enterprises" developed in fifth-century 
Athenians a most formidable type of hypocrisy and "moral rootlessness." 
It was the dissolution of the Athenian morale that contributed more to its 
decline of power than any other particular factor. 
^Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 285. 
^Sophocles, "Oedipus at Colonus" trans. Whitney J. Oates, op. cit., 
p. 750. 
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The aftermath of the war left Athens morally and spiritually de¬ 
praved. The traditional passion of the Athenians for the externalities of 
pomp and circumstance was ever at variance with their uncertain morality 
and religion. This breach between the real and the ideal widened into an 
almost impassable gulf which bode evil on every hand. 
Obviously, an atmosphere like that, fraught with deception, intrigue, 
immorality, and greed was not too conducive to exalted dreams and aspiration 
in search for the highest good. This was the age in which the "veil of tra¬ 
ditional piety" must be rent to find beneath it what O'Neill, hundreds of 
years later, termed "the sickness of today." However, this insurmountable 
obstacle of "mythical tradition" from time immemorial had been the only 
subject for poetry and it was unheard of to consider any other material. 
Because Euripides' heart was full of compassion for all men, and 
suffering of all humanity appealed to him, it is small wonder that he would 
be the first poet whose works depicted reality as he actually saw it, what¬ 
ever the results.^- The aftermath of the war and its ensuing evils caused 
Euripides, like O'Neill, to doubt the Divine wisdom of the gods, and, being 
a skeptic and a seeker after Truth, he felt such a perpetual strife waging 
between man and Providence that even his dramas could not reconcile. Al¬ 
though Euripides felt that this was the time to grapple with the problems 
and pathos of life as he saw it, he had no idea at all of completely re¬ 
jecting mythology, but he used it more essentially as instruments to show 
the gods in their true perspectives their helplessness, imbecility, and 
^Barrett H. Clark, op. cit., p. 37. 
^William Cranston lawton, "Euripides" Library of the Y.'orld's Best 
literature, ed. Charles D. Narner (New York, I897), X, 5570. 
impossibility. As could be expected, Euripides was most unpopular as are 
all revolutionaries. To contradict comfortable conventional views and to 
explode doubtful assumptions is to condemn oneself to a life of utter lone¬ 
liness. Being lonely, though, was definitely not out of harmony with 
Euripides’ own personality, because while his body lived a rather quiet, 
solitary life, it is said that "his soul moved among vast, remote heights 
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and distances." 
Contrary to tradition, the heroes and heroines of Greek tragedy had 
been men and women of nobility, but to Euripides whose heart was filled with 
compassion for the pathos of human life at all levels, representing bourgeois 
ideals was a natural expression of his interest in human problems. Questions 
of sex, marriage, and the position of women were tabu during the age of 
Euripides, but as he shrank from discussing no question of "heaven or earth" 
his presentation of a play like "Medea" was rather typical of the man. 
"Medea" is the tragedy of a barbarian queen whose unrequited love 
compels her to commit the most heinous crimes. As the story unfolds, we are 
given glimpses into the labyrinthine recesses of a tortured soul incited by 
primitive passions and a wilful character into the final fulfillment of her 
tragic end. Medea's soul-searing love for Jason enjoys consummation for 
all too brief a time, because early in the play it is unfolded that 
... now their souls are filled 
Mth ruthless hates, and all affection's lost: 
For false to his sons, and her I serve, 
With a new consort of imperial birth 
Sleeps perfidious Jason.3 
^William Cranston Iawton, op, cit., p. 5571» 
^Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 35>7• 
-’Euripides, "Medea", trans. Michael Wodhull, World's Greatest 
literature (New York, 1900), p. 89. 
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With this knowledge as to the cause of Medea's unleashed wrath, the inten¬ 
sity of Medea's passion is heightened in the nurse's added explanation that 
On a couch she lies, no food 
Receiving, her whole frame subdued in grief; 
And since she marked the treachery of her lord, 
Melts into tears incessant, from the ground 
Her eyes she never raises, never turns 
Her face aside. 
# # * * 
She evens hates her children, nor with joy 
Beholds them:- much I dread lest she contrive 
Some enterprise unheard of, for her soul 
Is vehement, nor will she tamely brook 
Injurious treatmentj well, full well I know 
Her temper which alarms me ... 
For dreadful is her wrath, nor will the object 
Of her aversion gain an easy triumph.^ 
This revelation of character of the spurned and deserted Medea foreshadows 
the heart of the tragic element in the play — Medea's utter lack of the 
highest value in life, "sophrosyne*" or balance and harmony and proportion. 
By Medea's very first words we can fathom the over-wrought state and un¬ 
balance of her mind. 
Medea (within). Ah me', how grievous are my woes! What 
means 
Can I devise to end this hated life? 
I have endured alas! I have endured   
Wretch that I am  such agonies as call 
for loudest plaints.  2 
Here Euripides prepares the audience for the new element of realism by the 
anticipation of the subsequent deterioration of Medea's mind by revealing 
insanity in all its terrible manifestations. This type of stark realism 
j~Ibid., p. 90. 
2Ibid'., p. 92. 
in -which was probed the thwarted world of man’s deepest emotions and passions 
was a new departure even to the jaded but cultured Athenian taste. Euripides' 
distress at the pathos of human life endowed him generously with the gift of 
depicting these elemental passions and emotions as they conflicted with the 
intellectual forces of the soul.'*' With ruthless realism, Euripides explored 
the affliction of Medea's soul in which suffering had so warped her character 
that she inflicted suffering on all those around her. Her distraught mind is 
pictured in the words of her nurse who warns the attendants to keep Medea's 
children as far away from her as possible 
Nor suffer them to come into the presence 
Of their afflicted motherj for her eyes 
Have I just seen vdth distraction fired, 
As if some horrid purpose against them 
She meant to execute; her wrath I know 
Will not be pacified, til on some victim p 
It like a thunderbolt from heaven descends. 
Like O'Neill, Euripides' emphasis on the newly discovered subjective 
world enabled him to portray with untrammeled realism the disturbed world of 
Medea's passion for Jason and the fact that she was rejected and scorned. 
Medea's rage could not attend the justice of heaven to avenge her wrongs. 
These matters of immediate concern to her must be dealt with according to 
the dictates of Medea's twisted mind. 
Medea's refusal to wait resignedly upon the justice of heaven reveals 
clearly that Euripides, like O'Neill also, doubted the Divine wisdom and felt 
a high degree of compassion for Medea's unfair lot even though she allowed her 
human passion to over-rule her wisdom thereby being directly responsible for 
her own suffering. In meditating upon the problem of responsibility, Euripides 
“■'Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 353* 
“^Euripides, op. cit., p. 92. 
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placed it upon the souls of men an women, especially those of high estate 
as is suggested in these lines 
... for the souls 
Of kings are prone to cruelty, so seldom 
Subdued, and over others wont to rule, 
That it is difficult for such to change 
ïheir angry purpose.^ 
Medea's fertility in devising horrors untold are the seeming results of an 
unbridled temper which has never been subjected to control because she has 
been so long in an atmosphere of moral dominance. That Medea's sufierings 
were the outcome of her own cruelty indigenous to her irrepressible passions 
is evident in the voices of the chorus saying 
Alasl thou wretched woman, overpowered 
Ey thy afflictions ... 
Into what storms of misery have the gods 
Caused thee to rush'. 2 
The capriciousness of destiny which lures men into the valley of death was 
a fact that troubled Euripides as he discloses in the statement above. 
This is a reiteration of the perplexity of the predecessors of Euripides as 
they probed to search for an answer to the contradiction of man's sovereign¬ 
ty and his simultaneous thralldom in the universe. Man is free, yet he is 
enslaved. When Jason at last comes face to face with Medea in the depths 
of her agony, he tries vainly to placate her by rationalization, so charac¬ 
teristic of Euripides' age. 
Are you not aware 
You soon will change your mind and grow more wise? 
Forbear to spurn the blessings you possess, 
Nor droop beneath imaginary woes, 
When you are happy.3 
j-Ibid., p. 93. 
2Ibid., p. 100 
3TEIdT, p. 108 
Little does he know the extent a woman will go when she is spurned by the 
man she loves. As she violently reviles him for scoffing at her distress, 
Jason reminds her that it was her own free-will that led her to this dark 
abyss of disaster: "This was your own choice: Accuse none else," he adds. 
In pointing up the frailty of human nature as well as the material¬ 
ism of Athenian morality, Euripides suggests in the next few lines that the 
gods as well as men put more value on the material aspect of existence than 
on the "sanctity of holy things." When Jason boasts to Medea that his new 
bride would prefer his love to the gifts of Medea's exquisite robe, she 
makes this inclusive observation: 
Speak not so hastily; the gods themselves 
By gifts are swayed, as fame relates; and gold 
Hath a far greater influence o'er the souls 
Of mortals than the most persussive words.1 
By their absorption in the mundane affairs of the city-states and an agita¬ 
ting cynicism of holy things, the Greeks found the problem of accountability 
for sins and suffering in the world of deep concern, just as they were to 
O'Neill. Euripides asserts that Fate operates only in the most detached 
terms when a person's love of gold, of the externalities of the cosmos can 
cause suffering and evil in the world. Ihe love of the externalities repre¬ 
sents the cosmic forces forever warring against Jason's hopeful but wishful 
boast to Medea that 
... for if the dame 
On me place real value, well I know 
My love she to all treasures will prefer.2 
The consequent and untimely death of Jason's new bride who, as soon as she 
saw the glittering ornaments, could not resist the worldliness of the gifts 
shows that to the Athenians the force of cosmic evil was much stronger than 
the spirit of seeking the highest spiritual good. Not being deepened spiri¬ 
tually to see beyond the superficiality of the dazzling exterior, the Athenians 
were unable to comprehend the meaning of Euripides' tragedy in having the new 
bride consumed by her own greed. 
Euripides, it seems, is criticising the Athenians for their love of 
wealth and power over and above their veneration for spiritual principles. 
The horrible death of the new bride is a foreshadowing and warning to the 
Athenians that their feverish attempts at maintaining the piety and respect¬ 
ability of their forebears v/ere destined to ultimate destruction by the moral 
and spiritual deceptions threatening the very foundation of Athenian ascend¬ 
ancy. Their own growing proclivities for the unenduring values of material 
splendor were creating within the Athenian character a surer proneness to evil. 
The robe Medea offered the bride was in its manifestation a symbol of 
the eternal conflict between man's freedom to choose between the good and the 
evil. Whatever his choice, Euripides suggests, man must make it in the light 
of his own conscience. 
The revolutionary spirit of his age and the natural skepticism and 
intellectualism of his own nature prevented Euripides from tethering himself 
to any one identifying or characteristic dogma such as may be attributed to 
Aeschylus' religious fervor and "belief in the divine Justice of God" and 
Sophocles* tragic "inevitability of suffering." Euripides was a searcher 
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for truth who probed, as did O'Neill, beneath the "apparent veil of reality" 
to discover the hidden secrets of the soul. Perplexed by the pathos of human 
life, the capriciousness of destiny, and the evident disparities in the dis¬ 
tribution of man's lot on earth, Euripides was the very first poet who de¬ 
liberately worked on the principle that poetry should depict reality as it 
is found in actual life. What Euripides found in the penetralia of man's 
soul accounted summarily for the resultant observation that: 
Not now for the first time do I esteem 
Human affairs a shadow. Without fear 
Can I pronounce, they who appear endued 
With wisdom, and most plausibly tricked out 
Specious harangues, deserve to be accounted 
The worst of fools. The man completely blest 
Exists not. 
This thought is justly reminiscent of Sophocles' acquiescence of the shadowy 
nothingness of human strength and happiness. 
Euripides rails at the injustice of man's treatment by a universe 
that rejects his supremacy. He echoes the refrain prevading most of Greek 
thought that though man has conquered every other living creature in the 
universe he has been unable to conquer himself and the mystery of death. 
Again we are faced with the problem insoluble: What is the meaning of life 
and sin, since to live is to sin? Is there any possibility of a relative 
harmony between the forces of evil and those of good? Can one develop 
faith in the remote justice of the world- process which denies, in the com¬ 
prehensive utterance that "Not now for the first time do I esteem human 
affairs a shadow," man a fair chance in the arena of life? Can man ever 
^Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 342. 
2Euripides, op. cit., p. 129. 
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hope for a millenium in which the spiritual values inherent in the eternal 
verities will triumph over the cosmic laws of nature and evil and sin? 
In Greek thought it is man's own baleful machinations which sub¬ 
ordinate the millenium. This predilection to sin is captured in Medea's 
anguished self-denunciation as she admits "How wretched I am through my 
own perverseness." In abject wretchedness Medea continues her soul-search¬ 
ing tirade as she laments that 
... My afflictions 
Have conquered me; I now am well aware 
What crimes I ventured ons but rage, the cause 
Of woes most grievous to the human race, 
Over my better reason hath prevailed.^- 
Medea's confession and awareness of her own affliction shows Euripides' con¬ 
cern with "rationalism which was beginning to take possession of the great¬ 
est of all cultural forces -— religion, morality, political theory, and 
poetry. 
In his tragedy "Hippolytus," we find Euripides' world was one in 
which there was little faith either in man or the gods as witness the frenzy 
and wrath of Theseus' words after reading the fatal letter written in venge¬ 
ance by Phaedra who killed herself because spurned love of Hippolytus. Or 
was it mere perversity? In his wrath Iheseus interprets his son's innocent 
bewilderment at Phaedra's untimely death as baleful effrontery and he dashes 
out 
Oh the Blind of mortal man I to what 
lengths will it proceed? 
What limit will it bold assurance have? 
For if it goes on growing as man's life 
~4bid,, p. 12?. 
^Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 3^1» 
Advances, and each successor outdo 
The man before him in villainy, the 
Gods -will have to add another 
Sphere unto the world, which 
Shall take in the knaves and villains.1 
Man’s propensity to sin was becoming so bold and intense that ere long a new 
world would be needed to hold all the sinful. The problem of sin grows more 
pressing as men become more negligent of the verities of life. 
The core of Euripides' philosophy is "cabined” in this next song of 
the chorus, as he struggles to reconcile or to make fairly compatible the 
eternal strife between man and Fate, a reconciliation that always seems 
nebulous and unattainable at best. 
Theseus has decreed that Hippolytus be exiled because of his alleged 
corruption of Phaedra's womanhood. The seeming inanity and purposelessness 
of Hippolytus' loyalty to Phaedra in not breaking an oath she had duped him 
into making symbolizes to me the inconsequential and misplaced loyalties men 
adhere to which stifle really good intentions of becoming better beings. 
This duplicity of the gods who make human beings to have characters and wills 
which cause their suffering adds to the questioning comments made by the 
chorus on the whole piteous irony of human life* 
In very deed the thought I have about 
The gods, whenso they come into my 
Mind, do much to soothe its grief, 
But though I cherish secret hopes 
Of some great guiding will, yet am 
I at fault when I survey the 
Fate and doings of the sons of 
Men; change succeeds to change, 
And man's life veers and shifts 
In endless restlessness.^ 
^Euripides, "Hippolytus", trans. 'Whitney J. Oates, op. cit., p. 787 
^Ibid., p. 791. 
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Euripides' speculations on the powerlessness of man to secure completely 
"some great guiding will" and the vagaries of Fortune show the doubt and 
pessimism in both the gods' ability to bring on a better world and man's 
weakness in developing his will to the extent that he can combat on an 
equal footing the capriciousness of Fate, 
The comments on the fanatical adherence of the Athenians to exter¬ 
nal respectability while simultaneous degeneration takes place are evidenced 
in this eloquent speech by the chorus concerning man's disproportion. 
Fortune grant me this, I pray, at, heaven's hand,   a happy lot 
in life and a soul from sorrow free; opinions let me hold not too pre¬ 
cise nor yet too hollow; but lightly changing my habits to each morrow 
as it comes, may I thus attain a life of bliss.^ 
Theseus' too precise and yet too hollow opinions hastily formed by the evi¬ 
dence of Phaedra's letter of vengeance and his ignorance of her motives 
seem to me indicative of Euripides' biting criticism of the Athenians of 
his age in which those "who appear endued with wisdom" such as Theseus 
deserve to be counted as fools because of their opinionated and outmoded 
manner of thinking. The new morality represented by Hippolytus is a threat 
to the type of complacent, tradition-bound society Theseus' attitude repre¬ 
sents. Phaedra's fruitless seduction of Hippolytus means to me the continu¬ 
ous struggle between the evil and good forces forever prevalent in the world. 
That the outmoded thinking of Theseus representing the cosmic laws should 
succeed in banishing and destroying the moral laws symbolized, let us presume, 
in Hippolytus' innocence and chastity is not at all surprising. This was 
merely, I believe, a foreshadowing of the decline of Athenian ascendancy 
llbid., p. 792. 
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brought on by the decline of their moral and spiritual values. 
Theseus' grief and repentance may be compared to the grief that is 
to befall the ill-fated glory of Greece. Theseus' words "I am a broken man; 
yes, I see the gates that close upon the dead" are prophetic. The Athenians 
were consciously and richly endowed to choose their own destiny, but by the 
very bent of their character  they were tense, wrathful, and impetuous   
as represented by Theseus 
... alike in his eyes and mine hast shown thy evil heart, in that 
thou hast forestalled all proof or voice prophetic, hast made no in¬ 
quiry, nor taken time for consideration, but with undue haste cursed 
thy son even to death. 
As an indictment of his own age "Hippolytus" is powerful in its 
treatment of Euripide s'answer to the problem of responsibility. Should the 
balance of opinion fall to the side of accepting Euripides' work as a symbol 
of the revolutionary spirit of the rationalization of his age, then the 
writer feels that the poet believed that the individual created his own 
destiny despite unseen and, obviously, inexplicable forces driving him help¬ 
less to certain destruction. 
Euripides' treatment of the famous legend of the House of Atreus 
follows closely the basic aspects found in the views of his predecessors. 
Because of Euripides' interest in the inner conflicts of man's existence, 
his version naturally portrays the idea of the rational approach to man's 
motives rather than the mythological explanation. His concern to seek for 
truth behind man's natural tendency to sin caused him to look beyond the 
traditional world of religion to discover the working of the individual's 
^-Gilbert Murray, op. cit., p. 1$3« 
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soul. His was a ceaseless effort to reconcile the enormity of man's emo¬ 
tional world with that of the rational. 
In his "Electra" this psychological insight is emphasized "with a 
power of sympathy and analysis unrivalled in ancient dramaby his innate 
ability to probe to the heart of the characters and really delineate them 
as flesh and blood entities with down-to-earth problems of mankind. The 
very first scene tells of the unnatural and traumatic childhood of both 
Orestes and Electra who were nurtured in an atmosphere of hate and murder 
and guilty love. 
The lives of both Orestes and Electra were threatened by the un¬ 
easy and vengeful Aesgisthus. A softening note that prevents Clytemnestra 
from being devoid of all humanness is that she saved Electra from being mur¬ 
dered by Aegisthus. 
To Euripides, Aegisthus, despite his cruelty, was a rather pathetic 
figure whose hardened character was typical of the Athenian veneration of 
wealth and power. His life as "that woman's husband" was miserable. 
Thinking that his good looks and wealth would boost his superiority was a 
mistake made by Aegisthus, as Euripides explains: 
'Tis nature that stands fast, not wealth. For it, if it abide 
unchanged, exalts man's horn; but riches dishonestly acquired in the ^ 
hands of fools, so soon take their flight, their blossom quickly shed. 
It is nature, too, that keeps Electra’s mind forever on avenging 
her father's murder. long ago she gave up the idea of ever being happy 
because as she says 
^Gilbert JAirray, op. cit., p. 153. 
^Euripides, "Electra", trans. V/hitney J. Oates, p. 9h. 
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No god hearkens to the voice of lost Electra, or heeds the sacri¬ 
fices offered by my father long ago. Ah woe for the dead! woe for 
the living wanderer, who dwelleth in some foreign land, and outcast 
and a vagabond at a menial board, sprung though he is of a famous sire. 
Myself, too, ... wasting my soul with grief, and exile from my father's 
halls, ... while my mother is wedded to a new husband in a marriage 
stained by blood.1 
By this speech we can tell what has been in Electra's soul all 
these years. It is not difficult to compromise Electra's persistent goading 
of her brother into the bloody business of vengeance when he falters now and 
then. When Orestes prays a little longer than the impatient Electra thinks 
is expedient she answers that it is time to part. 
Ibid., p. 71. 
CHAPTER n 
EUGENE O'NEILL'S VIEW OF MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY 
Surrounded by circumstances as complex and as fraught with the 
elements of tragedy as any in the forty-seven plays he -wrote, Eugene 
Gladstone O'Neill, in November, I9$k, came to the end of dedicated pil¬ 
grimage in which virtually all of the forces of the human spirit had in some 
manner been injected. The cross-currents of Destiny finally overtook him on 
his interminable quest for the solution of man's eternal problems and battles 
with himself and the universe. Death, however, found him still at variance, 
from all exterior evidences, with the tangled purposes of life. As yet, it 
is comparatively evident that he had not been successful in fathoming the 
infinite complexities of human life which had baffled him so very long. Now 
his quest was over and American drama was bereft of its most dynamic and 
compelling figure, Eugene O'Neill, "The Inevitable", an appellation given 
him by the outstanding critic Joseph Wood Krutch in his article "Eugene 
O'Neill The Inevitable",1 
Eugene O'Neill: The Inevitable. If, as John Stuart Mill says, 
"nothing which has happened to the person throughout life being without its 
portion of influence"2 is true, and if we agree with the poet that we are a 
part of all that we have met, it is safe to assume that O'Neill's concept of 
man's relation to an implacable universe was in large measure conditioned 
by the nature of his own individualism and experiences. 
Only a person possessed of a deep, piercing insight into the rampant 
distresses of human existence, only one who neither shrank from the lurid 
^Joseph Wood Krutch, "Eugene O'Neill, The Inevitable'^ Theater Arts, 
XXXVIII (February, 195U), 66. 
2John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, (New York, 18U6), p. 
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aspects of life now recoiled from portraying truth as he saw it could have 
invaded the penetralia of the soul as did Eugene O'Neill. In his forays 
on the subterranean recesses of the soul, O'Neill’s moving depictions of 
upheavals found in this "dark-valley" were not the vacuous rantings of an 
armchair philosopher, but, rather, they were of necessity the outpourings 
of personal travail and the "poet's own pilgrimage" into the illimitable 
and spiritual realms of lives buffeted by the forces their hapless wills 
could not withstand. 
Forced by the immutable law of his own brooding and susceptible 
nature and heightened also by the fact that children of famous actors 
usually live beyond the normal pale, O'Neill's personality was intensified 
by the urgency of his environment. In a world in which the times were "out 
of joint," one that was "stale, flat and unprofitable" surely O'Neill un¬ 
consciously absorbed to an enormous degree the basal tenets of the Doctrine 
of Necessity which permeates so much of his work. The temper of his age 
was naturally a forcible factor in impelling him to probe with keenest 
perception the idea that 
We are all in the grip of cosmic forces over which we have no 
control, that either chance or blind fate determines the nature of 
the individual man ... that the individual is not responsible for 
his deeds ... and that time is but a "maniac scattering dust" and 
life but a "Fury slinging flame."2 
Trapped in the maelstrom of doubt, cynicism, and futility engendered 
by a highly mercurial hedonism and revolt of tradition following World War I, 
O'Neill was, as John Nelson says: 
■*Fred B. Millett and Gerald E. Bently, op. cit., p. l$k. 
2Edward Mims, op, cit., p. I43. 
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... a symbol of his own age. His independence and daring, on one 
hand, and a measure of groping on the other. He symbolizes the bold 
spirit of the period, its willingness to venture on untried ways, and 
he symbolizes no less its restlessness of temper and a dissatisfaction 
with itself.■*- 
Frankly contemptuous and bored with the outmoded virtues of tradition, 
O'Neill, even in his early years, was living unconsciously a vastly fuller 
life than ordinary men. "He lives to the utmost possibilities of human 
nature both in good and evil."^ This deeper living O'Neill learned as his 
experiences and temperament propelled him forward in his relentless quest 
of ferreting out and probing with and everlasting "why?" the meaning of 
the elemental forces which keep human being forever at odds with life and 
themselves. 
Chafing under the expressive restlessness of his spirit and of the 
times also, the sensitive and rebellious O'Neill wandered about the world 
in an orgy of self-imposed exile. His unforgettable encounters with the 
dregs of humanity enriched and deepened his sympathy for the oppressed and 
desolate, a fact emphasized by Joseph "Wood Krutch who states that 
The forces which drove O'Neill to participate in the tumultuous 
experiences which gave him a background for his dramas were not the 
forces of thought, but of nature, of personality. He is a brother 
to the fierce passions and furies that make up the lives of those whom 
he comes in contact with.3 
As O'Neill watched with intuitive perception, broadened by his own 
innate curiosity, the all but futile struggle of human beings in the throes 
of despair, the ancient problem of religion and the moral order captivated 
his mind. The question "Why does God send suffering into the world?" was one 
^John H. Nelson, Contemporary Trends Since 19lU (New York, 1947)» 
P • 13 • - 
^Richard D. Skinner, "O'Neill and the Poet's Quest", North American 
Review, CCIX (June, 1935), 55» 
3Joseph Wood Krutch, "The God of the Stump", The Nation, CXIX, 
November 26, 192k, p. 579» 
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that disturbed him at all times. The intensity- of this question -was magni¬ 
fied when, weakened by dissolute living, O’Neill learned he would soon fall 
prey to the ravages of tuberculosis. 
On the advice of his doctor, O’ Neill spent a revitalizing and con¬ 
templative period in the sanitorium, where he had ample time to review his 
meaningless existence and to come to grips with himself by trying to solve 
the mystery of life. It was here that the idea occurred to him to portray 
by means of drama the doubts, the fears, and the conflicts which had for 
so long dogged his own footsteps. Having grown up in an "atmosphere red¬ 
olent of grease-paint and footlights," O’Neill, as the "legitimate child of 
the theatre," had a rich heritage on which to draw after his own peculiar 
"strange interlude" into the langled thickets of "this untelligible life." 
In addition to drawing richly upon his own fortuitous experiences 
and spending a year of formal study at Harvard, O'Neill steeped himself in 
the works of the noble Greeks whose influences etched idelible inroads up¬ 
on his accounts of "human aspirations, horizons, and roots." Although Ibsen, 
Strindberg and Shaw helped to synthesize his "tragic sense" it was, indu¬ 
bitably, the noble Greeks-Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides— who gave 
fervor to his desire to crystallize dramatically the disturbing glimpses he 
had caught of the human soul in the mazes of inescapable Fate. 
O'Neill's interest, real or imagined, in Freudianism gave his critics 
the opportunity to accuse him of being unable to cope with reality and that 
his interest in the subconscious was in effect a flight into an ivory tower. 
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Upon being asked to what extent he really used Freudianism and other psycho¬ 
analytical theories in his works, O'Neill replied that there was never any 
conscious effort on his part to use Freud's theory in any of his works. He 
added that his native dramatic instinct and his own personal experience 
alone guided him."*" 
It was fortunate for American drama that O'Neill was not economical¬ 
ly compelled to serve the demands of the theatre except on his own terms. 
By being at liberty to exercise his own daring and courage and creative urges, 
he raised the stature of American drama. His plays from 19lit to 1920 served 
as most promising preludes to his greater achievements and maturity in the 
matter of combining stark realism, a profound sense of futility and disillu¬ 
sionment, strengthened by the growing conviction that man was more than ever 
the victim of circumstances. 
Since O'Neill was relieved of the responsibility of following the 
tradition of the American theatre, he had unlimited opportunities to give 
wings to his imagination and creativity. Consequently, he vowed to write 
about anything, in any manner that fitted or could be invented to fit his 
themes. Said he 
And I shall never be influenced by any consideration but onet Is it 
true as I know it or, better still, feel it? If so, shoot, and let 
the splinters fly wherever they may ... I want to do whatever gives me 
pleasure and worth in my own eyes, and I don't care to do what doesn't 
... It is just life that interests me as a thing itself.^ 
This freedom from traditional restraint earned him the "pre-eminence of 
America's foremost dramatist who wrote and successfully demanded for the 
American playwright a declaration of independence and a charter of liberty."3 
^A. H. Nethermost, "O'Neill on Freudianism", The Saturday Review of 
literature, May 28, 1932, p. 754. 
^Barrett H. Clark, An Hour of American Drama (Philadelphia, 1930), 
P. 37. . 
-'Joseph Wood Krutch, op. cit., p. 66. 
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Throughout his plays, O'Neill never played false his vow to consi¬ 
der only truth as he saw it. His indifference to world standards and his 
rejection of any philosophy except that which expressed truth to him caused 
Fred Eastman to observe that 
No other playwright of modern times has developed a greater inten¬ 
sity of power in crises which he contrives for his characters. No 
other reveals the souls of men and women naked and stripped of all 
pretenses. 
Eugene O'Neill and the Doctrine of Necessity.   The aftermath of 
World War I aggravated most seriously the sensibilities of O'Neill by 
accelerating the destruction of many of the spiritual and moral principles 
upon which American life and thought had been predicated. Incorporated in 
his works, are evidences of constant struggles between the inherent princi¬ 
ples of the Puritan culture representing the old-fashioned virtues and con¬ 
ventions versus paganism embracing the pervasive hedonism, the re-discovery 
of sex, the restless craving for excitement, speed, sensationalism, and 
emotionalism.^ 
For a while, it seemed, O'Neill followed the train of thought 
characteristic of the "lost generation" which rejected vehemently civiliza¬ 
tion as being irreparably demoralized. Uncertainty, pessimism, rebellious¬ 
ness, and complete repudiation of all established principles were naturally 
the result of this highly fluid and disintegrating culture to which O'Neill 
was heir. As cycnicism and irrationalism widened in it scope, O'Neill became 
more and more contemplative, bringing into focus his keenest and most incisive 
perceptions of human endeavors and aspirations. As attested to by his check- 
ered career and by the ideas drawn from his works, O'Neill developed an  
"'’Fred Eastman, "Eugene O'Neill and Religion", Christian Century, 
July 26, 1933, p. 956. 
^J. H. Nelson, op. cit., p. 16. 
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enduring obsession -with the "eternal problem of man’s paradoxical nature and 
his predicament in a universe which seems alien but to which he desires to 
be related."'*' 
like the noble Greeks, O'Neill was bewildered by the pain and 
suffering in the world. like the Greeks, he also wanted to find out who was 
responsible, man or God. It is, of course, quite impossible to ascertain to 
any absolute degree to what extent O'Neill’s concept of man was conditioned 
by the external events of his life. This much is true, though, that the ex¬ 
ternalities of O'Neill's life and the ineffable quality of his temperament 
were doubtlessly cogent factors in shaping his concept of man’s relation to 
God, an interest which underlies nearly all of his works. It may be con¬ 
jectured from the evidence of the great misery and confusion, illness, and 
unhappiness of his own life that he never found an answer to this problem, 
but the writer agrees that in the very fact that he was always searching he 
must have found the kind of solution which is qualitative in its ultimate 
possibility. As Kierkegaarecfe states in an article on "Training in Christi¬ 
anity 
What is true of the relation between two men is not true of the 
relation of man to God: that the longer they live together and the 
better they get to know each other, the closer do they come to one 
another. The very opposite is true in relation to God: the longer 
one lives with Him, the more infinite He becomes and the smaller 
one becomes oneself ... Alas, as a man, one discovers how infinite 
God is and the infinite distance.2 
From my study of O'Neill it seems that Kierkegaarde's observation is 
quite true, because the more O'Neill sought to find meaning in the relation 
between man and God, the more he became convinced that man was the mere  
^Joseph Wood Krutch, "O'Neill's Tragic Sense!,' American Scholar, XVI, 
(Summer, 191*7), 281*. 
^Soren Kierkegaarde, Training in Christianity, trans. Walter Lowrie, 
A Kierkegaarde Anthology, ed. Robert Bretall (Princeton, 19^1), p. 372. 
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insignificant -worm squirming aimlessly on the pavement of life, likely to be 
squashed by an external force or circumstance. Possessed of wisdom and com¬ 
passion for mankind earned through his own travail, O'Neill's attitude 
toward man's place in the universe was dominated by the view that even 
though man was important to himself, he was still a plaything of Fate, toss¬ 
ed about at the whims and mercurial vagaries of circumstance, chance, environ¬ 
ment, and heredity. As he pondered the why of man's existence and the mean¬ 
ing of suffering in the world, O'Neill, as evidenced in his plays, fixed the 
blame for man's inadequacy and his "bias toward evil" on the cosmic or exter¬ 
nal forces rather than, like the Greeks, on man's free will. If this is 
true, then, we may draw inferences that O'Neill's concept of man's relation 
to God, his place in the universe, and his bias toward evil are all based 
upon what John Stuart Mil calls the Doctrine of Necessity, the philosophy 
which asserts "human volitions and actions to be necessary and inevitable,"^ 
In taking the liberty of placing O'Neill in the midst of a contro¬ 
versy dating back as far as Pelagius, the British monk of the fourth century, 
the writer hopes to prove that the actions of O'Neill's characters are nece¬ 
ssary and inevitable, originating essentially from circumstances over which 
they have little or no control. Dogged by an oppressive futility and pessi¬ 
mism, O'Neill's characters are motivated from forces welling from externalities 
rather than from moral or inner compulsions of the free will doctrine as 
discussed in the preceding chapter on the Greek view of man's place in the 
universe. 
■'■John Stuart Mil, op. cit., p. 521. 
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O'Neill's characters, as -we shall point out, are trapped by a scorn¬ 
ful and alien universe as witness this comment on life in the "Strange Inter¬ 
lude" by Darrell, whose "long interlude of war with life" has caused him to 
lose all faith in God or the possibility of happiness on earth. In his des¬ 
pair and disbelief he almost unconsciously calls upon the very God in whom 
he has no faith. "Oh, God, so deaf and dumb and blind ... teach me to be 
resigned to be an atom."-*- To Darrell the atom was the most infinitesimal 
particle imaginable and to him man was about as insignificant in meaning and 
purpose to God as the atom is in size. Again we feel this alien isolation 
of man in relation to God as Nina who by her own selfishness has caused 
suffering to those about her. 
Nina, (thinking in desperate hysterical anguish) Oh, I wish Ned 
would go away and stay away forever. ... I can't bear to watch him 
suffer any morel... It's too frightful1.... Yes, God the Father, I hear 
you laughing... you see the joke... I'm laughing too...it's all so 
crazy, isn't it? 2 
life, to these deflected characters, is a big, meaningless joke and there 
is little compassion for man from God who is a detached and aloof Being. 
In all probability, this is some thing of what he had in mind as quoted in 
Joseph Mood Krutch's "Introduction" to the Nine Plays by O'Neill. 
"Most modern plays',' he said, "are concerned with the relation between 
man and man, but that does not interest me at all. I am interested only 
in the relation between man and God."3 
This comment by O'Neill is analogous to a statement by the eminent Russian 
philosopher, Nicolas Berdyaev, in his chapter on the "Origin of Evil 
The question of the distinction between good and evil and its origin 
^"Eugene O'Neill, Nine Plays (New York, 1932), p. 680 
^Ibid., p. 676. 
3Ibid., "Introduction", p, xvii. 
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can not be solved apart from the prior question as to the relation 
between God and man, bety/een the Divine and human freedom, or between 
grace and freedom. The feud between the Creator and the Creature 
which overshadovis our whole existence concerns evil and its origin.-*- 
As O'Neill searched for a compatible relation between man and God, he was 
fundamentally involved in the unfathomable fact of the "feud between the 
Creator and the Creature," the subsequent existence of evil in the world, 
and the inextimable misery in man's life. His tireless plumbing of the depths 
of reality revealed to him actualities so grim and so violent that he must 
have had little occasion to agree with Pippa as she sangr 
God's in His heaven  
All's right with the world I 
God may have been in His heaven but all was not right with O'Neill's 
world. While the source of tragic catastrophe in Greek concept of responsi¬ 
bility lay in man's freedom of the will to choose the good or the evil, the 
primary source of tragic conflict in O'Neill was found very often in some 
"psychological complex or obsession that warps the character and destroys the 
o 
individual's chance for a normally developing life." Too often these com¬ 
plexes and obsessions were not due basically to the freedom of the characters 
to choose their destinies, but they were more or less the results of the 
powerful influences of environment and circumstance and heredity. O'Neill's 
characters emphasized his belief that these externalities were the irrecon¬ 
cilable fact that man's character was formed FOR him and not, as in Greek 
thought, BY himj consequently, whatever actions follow from O'Neill's charac¬ 
ters are inevitable and necessary, the will having failed to follow the "be- 
hests of the spirit," As a result of man's actions being determined by the 
^Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of fen (London, 19l|8), p. 23. 
HiV. F. Taylor, A History of American letters (New York, 1936), p. itO?. 
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antecedents of his circumstance, environment, and heredity as implied in the 
■works of O'Neill, it is logical to assume that this is the basis of the con¬ 
cept he absorbed in his inexhaustible curiosity about man's predilection to 
sin ard its attendant despair. Eugene O'Neill's philosophy of man's account¬ 
ability for his sin is further substantiated by the fact that he was forever 
delving beneath the surface of things that seem to find the true meaning of 
things that actually are. 
His efforts at placing the responsibility for man as a sinner may 
be analysed in his searching drama "Mourning Becomes Electra" in which he 
used a "psychoanalytical approach in revealing its characters' unexpressed 
motives and their conflicts between expressed and unexpressed love."^ 
Realizing that the problem of sex, sensuality, and sin is a complex even in 
its simplest forms, O'Neill complicates affairs by giving his play an austere 
New England setting in which Puritanism augmented the general confusion and 
misery of characters doomed by an external concept called the Doctrine of 
Necessity. Buffeted on all sides by the natural and the traditional forces 
which created the Puritan heritage, the characters in "Mourning Becomes 
Electra" have of necessity become the unconscious victims of repressions 
and complexes concomitant of such an environment. 
The "bias toward evil" as delineated in this play is recognized as 
"residing not in the freedom of the will but in seme sloth of nature which 
man has inherited from his relation to the brute creation."^ The "sloth of 
nature" here is interpreted to be the conflicting forces of Puritan repres- 
sion of the sex urges and natural expressions of love versus the rebellious 
^Joseph Wood Krutch, op. cit., p. 67. 
^Rheinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York, 1951) 
p. 239. 
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pagan spirit which strives for creativity. 
As a "circumnavigator of the soul," O'Neill's voyages into this un¬ 
intelligible world of the Puritan spirit begins with Seth, the old Mannon 
servant, boasting of his master's unprepossessing reputation in answer to 
what kind of man he is. 
Seth (boastfully expanding) He's able, Ezra is! Folks think he's 
cold-blooded and uppish, ’cause he's never got much to say to 'em. But 
that's only the Hannons' way. They've been top dog around here for 
near on two hundred years and don't let folks fergit it.3- 
Seth continues his proud exhibition of the Mannons' house of which "the temple 
portico is like an incongruous white mask fixed on the house to hide its 
somber gray ugliness." By the description of the "somber gray ugliness of 
the house "whose windows reflect the sun's rays in a resentful glare" and by 
the Hannons' "cold-blooded and uppish way," we assume that O'Neill accepted 
as one answer to his problem of man and his bent toward sin that the somber¬ 
ness and rigidity of an environment can play an immeasurable part toward 
shaping man's responsibility for sin. The "Hannons' way" of necessity must 
be traced to the tradition of Puritanism which in its strictest moral sense 
2 
has been in great error in its contribution to sin. This idea is also 
revealed in Hawthorne's The Scarlet letter. 
In response to the remark of a villager that there was something 
queer-looking about Christine's face, O'Neill reminds us again that the 
Hannons' inheritance of Puritanism, the force of environment, has her help¬ 
less in its powerful grip. Another villager answers that Christine's face is 
Secret lookin' ' s if it was a mask she'd put on. That's the 
Manons' look. They grow it on their wives. Seth's growed it on too, 
^Eugene O'Neill, op. cit., pp, 689-690. 
^Rheinhold Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 239. 
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didn't you notice -— frombeing with 'm all his life. They don't 
want folks to guess their secrets.■*- 
These suggestions prove that there can be very little doubt that the 
source of evil that caused the tragedy in "Mourning Becomes Electra" •was the 
powerful pressure of the proverbial firmness and repression of the New 
England forbears"^ and very likely that "deathless cramp of the will" sug¬ 
gested by the stubbornness depicted in Mary E. F. Wilkin's explanation of 
sternness, rigidity, and obstinany as qualities peculiarly indigenous to the 
New England environment. 
Although Ezra's wife Christine was not bom a Mannons she had by 
this time grown this mask-like look the Mannons' look. Again there seems 
to be the inescapable and dramatic force of the Doctrine of Necessity operat¬ 
ing in Christine's metamorphosis when O'Neill, "elbow deep in the stuff of 
life," begins anatomizing Christine's destiny, a destiny which sounded the 
death knell to the whole Mannons' household. Through his efforts to rend 
the veil of apparent reality therein are divulged many unexpected and intri¬ 
guing explanations that help us also to fix the blame for man's sins. 
O'Neill gives us in the next speech an insight into Christine's life before 
the "Mannons' way" had perverted her entire being. As Christine tries insid¬ 
iously to enlist against Vinnie the sympathy and support of the innocent 
Hazel, she is keenly aware of the insuperable gap between her own calculating 
cruelty and Hazel's straightforwardness and honesty. 
Christine, I was like you once—long ago—before—(Then with bitter 
longing) If I could have stayed as I was then! Why can't all of us 
remain innocent and loving and trusting? But God won't leave us alone. 
^Eugene O'Neill, op. cit.t p. 691. 
^Margaret Baldwin, "The Passing of Newr England!,' Atlantic Monthly, 
CXXIX, February, 1922, 191. 
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He twists and wrings and tortures our lives with others’ lives until— 
we poison each other to death.! 
Beneath the surface of Christine's bitter longing, there is discerned 
an intense, futile struggle between the pagan-Christian conflict exemplified 
in Christine's French ancestry and cosmopolitan New York environment over 
against her tragic attempts to escape the insidious, narrow, and unyielding 
Puritan environment and its attendant repressions which are "artificial 
attempts to conceal our real nature which approves the sex instinct as the 
purest manifestation of the creative impulse."2 Since her wedding night, 
Christine has had an unconquerable revulsion for her husband which, added to 
other external manifestations of the Hannons' ways, have caused, according 
to the Doctrine of Necessity, much of the suffering and sin visited upon the 
House of Mannons. In placing the responsibility for the long series of 
catastrophes which dogged to extinction the once proud fortunes of the 
tonnons, O'Neill's answer may lie partially in the fact that it was "the 
attempt to conceal the natural instinct which would affirm life as desir¬ 
able, but the Puritan is afraid of life and seeks death ewn in life."3 
Again O'Neill supports his belief that the Doctrine of Necessity is an un¬ 
deniable compulsion in directing human affairs. 
As we follow the upheavals of the tonnons, the baneful antecedents 
of their miserable lives make it almost utterly impossible for them to react 
in any other unpredictable manner. The inner conflicts of the sub-conscious 
initiated by the irrepressible outward propulsions of circumstances and 
environment have so cramped their wills that their actions seem plausible 
^Eugene O'Neill, op, cit., p. 75$ • 
2S$. Steinhauser, Eros and Psyche: A Nietzschean Motif in Anglo- 
American literature, MUV, 1XIV ^ April, 19h9)> p. 225» 
3Ibid., p. 226. 
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but uncontrollable, necessary, and inevitable. Canby declares that 
To the Mannons who have sinned against their own natures, love was 
a guilty passion, suppressed, explosive, and as such passed into the 
family character making a doom which is the core of the play. The pre¬ 
determined doom of the Hannons becomes a psychological nightmare des¬ 
troying those who suffer intensely from inner conflicts of passion and 
guilt.1 
0'Neill was always deeply troubled as to why a character was com¬ 
pelled to do various things. Why did Vinnie try to escape from love, a 
natural emotion? Why did she tell Peter WI don’t know anything about love! 
I don’t want to know anything'. (Intensely) I hate lovej” Was this a sub¬ 
conscious mechanism to stifle her hopeless passion for a man with whom her 
own mother was already so violently in love that she killed her husband to 
be with him? Perhaps Vinnie’s denial of love was her morbid guilt of her 
undue and fruitless prurience regarding Brant, her mother's lover? This 
suppression of her natural instinct to love voiced in her half-convincing 
"I hate love!" avowal can be traced, no doubt, to restrictions and neglect 
and rejection in childhood. Vinnie had always felt a barrier between her 
mother Christine and her, but it was Christine's own cruel revelation that 
Vinnie was the child of her disgust, rather than of her love. Christine 
bitterly recalls that once she loved Vinnie's father before marriage but 
that the romance soon turned to repulsion. Iavinia's answer justifies 
O'Neill's philosophy of the Doctrine of Necessity as being the underlying 
cause of these unnatural attitudes. 
Lavinia. (Wincing again — stammers harshly) So I was bom of 
your disgust! I've always guessed that, Mother,   ever since I was 
little when I used to come to you with love but you would 
■hfenry S. Canby, "Scarlet Becomes Crimson^ Saturday Review of Lit¬ 
erature, (November 7, 1931), P« 2^7» 
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always push me away! I've felt it ever since I can remember  
your disgust! (Then with a flare-up of bitter hatred) Oh, how I 
hate you! It is only light I should hate you! 
Christine. (Shaken — defensively) I tried to love you. I told 
myself it was not human not to love my own child, born of my body. 
But I could never make myself feel you were born of any body but his! 
fou were always my wedding night and my honeymoon! ^ 
No other scene in any of O'Neill's plays delves so deeply into the 
penetralia of the soul as does this one. Christine, stripped of all pre¬ 
tensions, admits that she has sinned against her own natural instinct of 
mother love. Vinnie has always been rejected, insecure, and unloved. Os¬ 
tensibly, then, her suppressed love for Brant bore the guilty taint of jeal¬ 
ousy, envy and revulsion. 
The neglected child, says Aichom in his book The Neglected Youth, 
refuses to take his place in Society. He cannot succeed in controlling 
instinctive impulses; cannot divert enough energy from his sexual in¬ 
stincts to employ them for purposes more highly esteemed by Society.^ 
That Vinnie was neglected and dominated by her mother while her brother 
Orin was loved is traumatic indication enough for Vinnie's "bias toward evil" 
and the direct accounting for its origin in Vinnie's life. Christine's dis¬ 
gust for her husband had diverted her love to her son Orin, which being tan¬ 
tamount to incest creates a guilt which drives Christine to her affair with 
Brant which ends with his being murdered by Orin who was goaded on by Vinnie 
in her hate for both her mother and Brant. Vinnie, in her rejection by her 
mother, has turned to her father whom she loves more than anyone else in the 
world —- that is until Brant appeared. Her guilt-laden passion for Brant is 
thwarted because of loyalty to her father, the jealousy of her mother, and 
■^Eugene O'Neill, op. cit., p. 7lU« 
2 Anna Freud, Psycho-Analysis for Teachers and Parents (New York, 
1935), p. 33. 
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the knowledge that hers was a wholly unrequited love for Brant by now comple¬ 
tely possessed by Christine. The Electra and Oedipus complexes are evident 
throughout the play. "Denied or rendered unable to respond to natural out¬ 
lets for the affections, the Hannon household is slowly eaten through by per¬ 
verted love, jealousy" 
"The strong link with the parents, in the first period, is a sign 
of retarded development if it still exists at the end of puberty," says 
Ann Freud. The retarded development of the emotional lives of Vinnie and 
Orin is reason enough to place the responsibility for their sins and suffer¬ 
ing on the externalities of the environment rather than on the freedom of 
their wills to choose deliberately. 
O'Neill's implied Doctrine of Necessity seems to bear an unusually 
close affinity to sin and responsibility expressed in The Pelagian Doctrine 
of sin which holds to the idea that 
The essential characteristic of Pelagianism is its insistence that 
actual sins can not be regarded as sinful or as involving guilt if they 
do not proceed from a will that is essentially free. The bias toward 
evil ... is found not in man's will but in the inertia of nature.^ 
There seems no positive proof in the play that Vinnie whose guilt was deeper 
than Orin's, had any deep-seated natural preference to evil. Because her 
emotional development had been retarded by traumatic circumstances from 
earliest infancy, Vinnie's responses to life were inevitable, necessary, 
and uncontrollable. Her volitions had been predetermined by the antecedents 
of rejection and hate by her mother, which developed an emotional instabil¬ 
ity and susceptibility to the capriciousness of circumstances. 
^Henry S. Canby, op. cit., p. 2£8. 
2Rheinhold Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 2li5>. 
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The idea that it is the Doctrine of Necessity that governs man's 
destiny is evidenced again in "The Strange Interlude," a play in which the 
characters who, unknown to themselves in all probability, have developed 
deep-rooted complexes impelled by psychological repressions of heredity and 
environment. The source of Nina's tragic catastrophe is in some type of 
psychological obsession that has warped her character and destroyed her 
chances for becoming a wholesome, well-balanced, normal human being.^ 
Emotionally unbalanced from frustration and deflection of her dear¬ 
est dream, Nina's solid values of life become oblique and out of focus with 
normalcy. O'Neill's interest in Nina, it seems, is in her consequent re¬ 
actions to life now that she is being confronted with a reality that is out 
of joint with her ideas of what constitutes reality. If we accept the 
definition that "tragedy is the epitome of life, life at its maximum tension, 
then we are justified in calling "The Strange Interlude" a sort of quasi¬ 
tragedy in which O'Neill "anatomizes" the personality of all the characters 
by penetrating to the remotest springs of action to seek motives for behavior 
that mounts to the maximum tensions of life. 
To underscore his doctrine that human beings are products of heredity 
and environment, O'Neill's settings are tremendously convincing in the ap¬ 
proximation of reality which creates the kind of atmosphere that gives sub¬ 
stance and validity to his probings of the dark recesses of the soul. The 
library of Professor Leed's home is the Puritan environment in miniature. 
Here we may assume that Nina has absorbed a moral discipline which permeates 
her every motive. 
tl, F. Taylor, op. cit., pp. I4.i3-i4.lii. 
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The atmosphere of the room is that of a cozy, cultured retreat, 
sedulously built as a sanctuary where, secure with the culture of the 
past at his back, a fugitive from reality can view the present safely 
from a distance, as a superior with condescending disdain, pity, and 
even amusement.1 
The play opens just as Nina is recovering from a nervous breakdown 
precipitated by the crash-death in the army of her air-pilot fiance*. Be¬ 
cause her scheming and ambitious father felt that Gordon's background and 
poverty were drawbacks to his social prestige and specifically because of 
jealousy, he persuaded her fiance to cancel their wedding plans. Gordon's 
death has caused a queer change to come over Nina which is reminiscent of 
the unfulfilled sex urges present in "Mourning Becomes Electra." Nina 
suspects that her father had something to do with Gordon's abrupt change 
in their plans, and so she is apprehensive of him now. liVhen Marsden, an 
old family friend, asks the professor if Nina suspects his complicity in 
destroying her wedding plans, the professor answers (startled). 
Yes. That's exactly it. She knows in seme queer way. And she 
acts toward me exactly as if she thought I had deliberately destroyed 
her happiness, that I had hoped for Gordon's death and been secretly 
overjoyed when the news came. (His voice is shaking with emotion) 
And there you have it, Charlie the whole absurd mes si (Thinking 
with strident accusation) And its true, you contemptible 1 2 
Professor Deed's analysis of the causes contributing to Nina's break-down 
gives us enough facts to follow O'Neill's Doctrine of Necessity that "given 
the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise 
the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he 
will act might be unerringly inferred,"^ O'Neill has already supplied the 
motives which fostered the breakdown, and from her surroundings, we infer 
^Eugene O'Neill, op. cit., p. 1*85. 
^Ibid., p. U90. 
3john Stuart Mill, op. cit,, p. 
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that she is still dominated by her Puritan environment. 
Nina’s loss of normal and clear perspectives represents to me the 
spectacle of a person caught in a vicious spiral of hopelessness. It seems 
on first thought that Nina's emotional maturity should have prevented the 
"tearing and stretching” of her soul to the breaking point. Yet when we 
recall the atmosphere of the professor's library, we can readily see that 
Nina's emotions had in all probability small chance for developing normally, 
if we conceive of the library as symbolic of the larger aspect of the Puritan 
environment. Always her surroundings had been that of a retreat and a sanc¬ 
tuary from reality. When she was unavoidably placed in a situation which ne¬ 
cessitated adult thinking, her response resulted in unhappiness for those 
with whom she came in contact. 
Nina's battle now was between the pagan forces of pleasure and hap¬ 
piness and the Christian elements of convention, duty, and self-dicipline. 
Her tragedy lies in the fact that even though she went to immoral extremes 
to deny and rebel against the convictions that threatened her natural sex 
instincts, she was never really happy because in the battle to exert her 
independence and revolt, she became callous, selfish, and devoid of moral 
principles which left her a more pathetic figure than ever. Even her old 
age promises nothing of inner peace. It is more of a compromise with life. 
In her rebellion against her father and her environment, Nina out¬ 
rages her father's Puritan morals by her outburst. Her regret at not giving 
herself to Gordon on his last night is now the basis for future promiscuity 
73 
•which she believes will atone for having denied her natural sex urges the 
last night she was with Gordon* 
Nina, (again with strange intensity) I must payl It's my plain 
dutyl Gordon is dead 1 What use is my life to me or anyone? But I 
must make use of it by giving iti (Fiercely) I must learn to give 
myself, do you hear give and give until I can make that gift of 
myself for a man's happiness without scruple, without fear, without 
joy except in his joyi When I have accomplished this I'll have found 
myself, I'll know how to start in living my own life againll 
It is plain to see the agitated state in which Nina's mind is grop¬ 
ing. All her previous Puritan training is not enough to buttress her against 
such immature notions about sex. From the extreme of total abstinence she 
veers to the other of promiscuity which in her over-burdened mind is atone¬ 
ment or, rather, rebellion against her strict adherence to the Puritan tradi¬ 
tion. The procession of the times caught up with Nina's Puritan prudery 
after she realized it was the forces of conventions and tabus to which she 
bowed on her last night with Gordon. The power of convention and environment 
over-powered her will, because as she said with fierce self-contempt. 
All that last night I knew he wanted me. I knew it was only the 
honorable, code-bound Gordon, who kept commanding from his brain, no you 
mustn't, you must respect her, you must wait till you have a marriage 
license. (She gives a mocking laugh) 
#*#*** ■» 
Gordon wanted me'. I wanted Gordonl I should have made him take mel 
I knew he would die ... that happiness was callingme, never to call 
again if I refuse 1 I didn't make him take me'. I lost him forever* 
And now I am lonely and not pregnant with anything at all, but  
loathing'. (She hurls this last at her father —- fiercely) Why did I 
refuse? What was that cowardly comething in me that cried, no, you 
mustn't, what would your father say?2 
^Eugene O'Neill, op. cit., p. £00 
2Ibid., p. 512. 
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Surely these are irrationalities of a mind over-burdened -with brooding and 
helplessness derivative of the Puritan tradition of suppression of natural 
instincts. This self-contempt at foolishly kneeling at the altar of con¬ 
vention has distorted her wholesome life-values to the extent that she has 
the absurd and twisted idea that by offering her body as an immolation for 
her refusal to yield to Gordon she can at last attain peace. That she failed 
in her attempted atonement is seen in the statement by Darrell which is des¬ 
tined to become part of a "Strange Interlude'.' 
Darrell. Nina has been giving way more and more to a morbid long¬ 
ing for martyrdom ... She hasn't convinced men of her love. And each 
experience of this kind has only left her more a prey to guilty con¬ 
science than before and more determined to punish herself! ^ 
Nina was not too long in perceiving the irrelevancy of her thinking, but 
not before she had become so devoid of feelings that she wanted only "sur¬ 
face life   no more depth, please GodI" Her avoidance of depths ironi¬ 
cally thrust her into an alliance with three men who were important to her 
only as far as her search for happiness was concerned. It is a touch of 
poetic justice that Marsden who was the most repulsive to her physically 
should be the one whom she is to spend the rest of her life with. As he 
tries to comfort her in her terrible loneliness, Marsden tells her that her 
life has been 
... an interlude, of trial and preparation say, in which our 
souls have been scraped clean of impure flesh and made worthy to 
bleach in peace. 
Nina answers with a strange smile: 
Strange interlude! Yes, our lives are merely strange, dark inr- 
 terludes-in the electrical display of God the Father.2  
Eugene O'Neill, op. cit., p. £17, 
2Ibid., p. 681. 
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"The Hairy Ape" is another interesting support of O'Neill's absorp¬ 
tion with "the eternal problem of man's paradoxical nature and his predica¬ 
ment in a universe in which he seems alien but to which he desires to be 
related. This play shows O'Neill's impression of human personalities as 
products of an environment in which their characters are formed for them 
and not by them as Greek tragedy implies. 
"The Hairy Ape" tells of the loneliness and defeat of an individual 
"from the wrong side of the tracks*" epitomizing in its stark realism the 
extraneous compulsions of poverty and ignorance as a basis for sin and suf¬ 
fering. Euripides realized this truth, too, as he concluded in his "Electra" 
that "Poverty suffers from this, that it teaches a man to play the villain 
from necessity." This view held by Euripides is definitely re-stated in 
O'Neill's "The Dreamy Kid" and "The Emperor Jones" as well as in "The Hairy 
Ape" which "dramatizes the theme of despairing humanity gazing blinded at 
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the stars." The force of environment as a déterminent of character develop¬ 
ment is shown in Yank's contempt for the word "home." 
Yank, (fiercely contemptuous) Shut up, yuh lousy boobl V/here d'yuh 
get that tripe? Home? ... T'hell wit home'. ... What d'yuh want wit home? 
(Proudly) I runned away from mine when I was a kid. O'ny too glad to 
beat it, dat was me. Home was lickings for me, dat's all. But yuh can 
bet your shoit no one ain't never licked me since.3 
Only a slight acquaintance with sociology and psychology would give an in¬ 
sight into the type of childhood Yank is referring to. It takes little imagj 
gination to fill in all the missing chapters of Yank's life which determined 
almost wholly his actions in adulthood. His running away from home is an 
index to the type of rebellious personality he must have been as a child. 
^■Joseph Wood Krutch, op. cit., p. 28U. 
^Stark Young, "Eugene O'Neill's New Play^ New Republic, LXVIII 
(November 11, 1932), p.302« 
3Eugene O'Neill, op. cit., p. k3* 
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The external exigences of his circumstances determined to a significant ex¬ 
tent the character^ of Yank ■whose actions throughout the play are activated 
far more from necessity than from his own volitions. 
For a long time apparently Yank has been pursued by the problem of 
"belonging,” of feeling wanted and needed and secure. Having missed the 
security that home and parents are supposed to supply, Yank felt desperately 
the desire of finding his place in the world. His bitter tirade against 
the leisure class expresses his yearning to be a part of the very object he 
denounced   materialism. Yank's experiences in a materialistic world have 
conditioned his thinking that this was the most desirable world to which he 
could belong. His bitterness springs from his knowledge that it is he and 
his kind who make the seemingly enviable world of success possible while at 
the same time being completely denied any part of it. 
Y/hen one of Yank's fellow coal stokers complains that they were only 
"wage slaves in the bowels of a bloody ship, sweating, burning up, eating 
coal dust," Yank's voice is heard bellowing an answer: 
Yank. Slaves, hell! We nan de whole woiks. All de rich guys 
tink dey're somep'n, dey ain't nothin'! Dey don't belong. But us 
guys, we'er in de move, we'er at de bottom, de whole ting is us.2 
Yank realizes his indispensability to the whole economic system, but at 
the same time he knows how inconsequential he is in reaping the reward of 
his indispensability. The incongruity of being at the core of the economic 
system and of an alien in the magnificent world created by this system was 
to Yank's mode of reasoning a frustrating experience. His resentfulness at 
being spied upon by Mildred, the daughter of one of the objects of Yank's 
^•John Stuart Mill, op. cit., p. £21;. 
^Eugene O’Neill, op. cit,, p. 1*1;. 
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hate, is understandable because her instinctive terror at the unbelievable 
inhuman conditions in the stoker makes her recoil at his bestiality. The 
suggestion that Mildred looked at him as though he were a hairy ape has 
burned itself into his subconscious to the extent that he is infuriated at 
any suggestion of such. Yank’s unhappy childhood created the bestial 
creature lie has now become. From this observation we can hardly impugn 
O'Neill’s philosophy that Yank was the product of his socio-economic envi¬ 
ronment "which teaches a man to play the villain from necessity," according 
to Euripides. 
O'Neill's theory of the Doctrine of Necessity is further advanced 
as he clinically but understandingly probes beneath the morbid boredom of 
a representative of those who live on the "right side of the tracks." 
Mildred is symbolic of the jaded, sophisticated society girl who will do 
anything for a thrill. Consumed by ennui brought on by too much money and 
leisure, Mildred strikes upon the exciting and daring ides of descending 
into the hold of the ship to find out what makes it operate. This, on the 
surface, is the result of a sophistication worn thin for want of purpose 
and direction. Being ridiculed by an aunt who fancies that she divines 
Mildred’s underlying motive in trying to find out about the "other half," 
Mildred, "protesting with a trace of genuine earnestness," says 
Please do not mock at my attempts to discover how the other half 
lives. Give me credit for sace sort of groping sincerity in that at 
least. I would like to help them. I would like to be of some use 
in the world. Is it my fault I don't know how? I would like to be 
sincere to touch life somewhere. (With weary bitterness) But I'm 
afraid that I’ve neither the -vitality nor integrity. All that was 
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burnt out in our stock before I was born. Grandfather1 s blast furnaces 
...making millions—...and little me at the tail-end of it all, I'm a 
waste product in the Bessemer process—like the millions. Or, rather, 
I inherit the acquired trait of the by-product, wealth, but none of the 
energy, none of the strength of the steel that made it.^ 
Plainly, then, O'Neill's Doctrine of Necessity is supported by such vivid 
and telling evidence that Mildred's character was formed for her by the 
circumstances contingent upon her wealth and her heredity. Her feeble at¬ 
tempts at altering her character by resorting to the independence of her own 
will are cut short by the languor of a disposition long ago determined by her 
antecedents of wealth and inheritance, which, as she admits, have left her 
neither the vitality nor the integrity to follow the decent dictates of her 
own free will. 
The keenness of Mildred's insult to Tank's pride has driven him to 
seek security in an organization dedicated to destroying just what his be¬ 
fuddled mind thinks he hates. Yank's distorted and confused behavior results 
in his being ''bounced" from this group with whom he tried to align himself. 
Before being ejected, however, the Secretary of the I.W.W. makes a succinctly 
scathing comment: 
Secretary. (He glares scornfully at Yank, who is sunk in an obliv¬ 
ious stupor) Oh, helll "What's the use of talking? You're a brainless 
ape. 
Yank, (aroused by the word to fierce but futile struggles) What's 
dat, yuh Sheeney bum, yuhl^ 
Now again Yank is forced to recognize his helplessness and meaningless in a 
hostile universe to which he so desperately desires to be in tune. His next 
speech shows his bewilderment and bitterness. 
Jlbid., p. 52. 
2Ibid., p. 83. 
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Yank, (bitterly) So dem boids don’t tink I belong neider ... 
Gimme a dollar more a day and make me happy ... Aw he 111 I can't see 
—- it's all dark, get me? It's all wrong; (He turns a bitter, mock¬ 
ing face up like an ape gibbering at the moon) Say youse up dere, Man 
in the Moon, yuh look so wise, gimme de answer, Huh? Slip me de inside 
dope, de information right from de stable —- where do I get off at, 
huh?i 
In this tragic and losing battle with himself and his passionate 
desire to be identified with what he had by necessity (the gods of capital¬ 
ism) been taught to believe was fundamental to belonging, Yank found himself 
a lonely, beaten individual trying hopelessly to understand what it was 
that caused him to wage war with Necessity. Again we are reminded of 
Euripides' admonition "Let us not wage war against Necessity." The shackles 
of Necessity were arrayed too formidably against Yank's feeble efforts to 
relate himself to an alien xmiverse. Heredity, environment, and circum¬ 
stances formed as impenetrable phalanx which defied any attack upon its im¬ 
pregnability. Even though Yank's volitions were sensitive enough to be 
outraged, the antecedents of environment were so strongly intrenched in his 
character that he was helpless in their ruthless grip. 
Yank recognizes this hopelessness when he engages in a monologue 
with the gorilla to whom he is mysteriously drawn for sympathy, 
Yank. ...Ain’t we both members of the same club de Hairy Apes? 
(They stare at each other a pause then Y ank goes on bitterly) 
So yuh're what she seen shen she looked at me, de white-faced tarti I 
was you to her, see? O'ny ou ta da cage broke out free to moider 
her, see? Sure, dat's what she t'oughtl She wasn't wise dat I was in 
a cage too worser'n yours sure a damn sight —- 'cause you 
got some chanct to bust loose but me (He grows confused)2 
Yank's confusion and helplessness must have been what Toynbee referred to 
j-Ibid., p. 83. 
2Ibid., p. 86. 
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in his article "The Ancient Mediterranean View of Man" in which he stated 
that it was depressing for man " to be let loose in a cosmic arena where the 
human gladiator is foredoomed to fight a losing battle."^ lank recognized 
his impotence in trying to wage war with Necessity. His cage is that of 
tradition, circumstance, and environment. His acknowledgement of his in¬ 
ability to "bust loose" implies an irresistibleness which profoundly disturb¬ 
ed O'Neill in his search for a reconciliation between God and man. This 
disturbance is expressed in Yank's musings on his relation to the gorilla 
when he says: 
Sure, you're de best offl Yuh can't tink, can yuh? Yuh talk neider. 
But I can make a bluff at talkin' and tinkin’ a'most git away wit it  
a'mostl and dat's where de joker comes in. (He laughs) I ain't on 
oith and I ain't in heaven, get me? I'm in the middle tryin' to separate 
'em, takin' all de woist punches from bot' of 'em, Yuh belongl Surel 
Yuh're de o'ny one in de woild dat does, yuh lucky stiff'.^ 
Although O'Neill recognized the impelling compulsion of the Doctrine 
of Necessity in the life of modern man, he was forever trying to reconcile 
this doctrine by trying to find out why it was such a redoubtable foe. in 
shaping the destiny of man. The irrelevancies and contradictions that made 
for man's inadequacies and for his seeming natural "bias toward evil" baffled 
O'Neill no little. Often he was stranded in the center of the stormy dilemma 
of life realizing that man belonged, like Yank, neither on the earth nor 
in heaven. He is just a punching-bag, more or less, "takin' all de woist 
punches from bot' of 'em." Though he wished desperately to belong, Yank's 
will was over-powered by the Doctrine of Necessity, a dreadful foe. O'Neill's 
close affinity between the Greek view of man and the modem view is 
^Arnold Toynbee, op. cit., p. 3» 
^Eugene O'Neill, op. cit., p. 86 
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indisputably established in Yank's final acceptance of his predicament, as 
shown in his answer to the policeman's question "What you been doin'?" 
This view was expressed nearly two thousand years before O'Neill by Sophocles 
in his tragedy "Oedipus at Colonus" in which the chorus speculates on the 
misery of mankindt 
Not to be born is, past all prizing, best; but, when man hath seen 
the light, this is next bestby far, that with all speed he should go 
thither, whence he hath come. 
One of the basic causes for sin is fear, and emotion that is common 
to all mankind. From the moment that Adam tasted the forbidden fruit, he 
was gripped by an elemental fear that has had its repercussions throughout 
the history of human existence. Says Nicolas Berdyaev: 
Fear experienced by the creature is a consequence of original sin 
and of a separation from God. ... Fear is the basis of our sinful life 
and penetrates into the loftiest spiritual regions, poisoning the moral 
and religious life ... Fear is the most ancient of man's affective states 
it accompanies his very birth and is always present in the subconscious 
layer of human nature.-5 
"The Emperor Jones," a psychological probing of the causes of fear, 
describes the "successive mental states" which fear and hunger can induce 
in an individual. If the writer is to adhere to the thesis of placing the 
responsibility of sin and suffering, it is not enough, then, to accept 
O'Neill's mere anatomizing of Brutus' fear and to place the causes of his fear 
and hunger as exhibit A of his tragedy. It goes deeper than that because 
Brutus' fear that caused him sin and suffering was predicated not upon his 
freedom or deliberate choice to sin, but on something beyond his control  
Yank. Enuf to gimme life fori I was born, see? Sure, dat's de 
charge. Write it in de blotter. I was born, getmel 1 
1. 
^Nicolas Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 171*. 
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Necessity. 
Brutus has contrived to secure a position of power and wealth which 
he knows to be unstable, but through resolute and despotic opportunism, he 
has assured himself, he believes, of his supremacy and mastery of a precari¬ 
ous situation. Finally comes the reckoning day when Brutus is cognizant 
that his sins have outstripped him. Desperately conscious that neither his 
superb physical prowess nor his keen mental acumen can extricate him from 
his impending doom, Brutus at last admits that the helplessness of his predica¬ 
ment is the result of his sin. At first glance it would seem that Brutus' 
greed for power and wealth was the sole responsibility for his sin and retri¬ 
bution symbolized in the sudden and complete reversal of his erstwhile as¬ 
cendancy. "Who was responsible for this piteous spectacle of humanity 
"stretched and torn" by the elemental urges of fear as is shown in this scene 
of abject terror? 
Oh, lawd, Iawd, Oh, Lawd, Lawdl (Suddenly he throws himself on his 
knees and raises his clasped hands to the sky — in a voice of agonized 
pleading) lawd Jesus, heah my prayerl I'se a po' sinner, I knows I 
done wrong, I knows itl^ 
O'Neill's answer to Brutus' bias toward evil may be inferred from this 
speech which gives us a background of the evil and sin committed by Brutus 
and the underlying causes therein. In reviewing his sins as a sort of in¬ 
timidation of the weakling Smithers who threatens to reveal his jail experi¬ 
ences in the states, Brutus replies callously that 
Maybe I goes to jail dere for gettin' in an argument wid 
razors ovah a crap game. Maybe I gits twenty years when dat colored 
^Eugene O'Neill, op, cit., p. 26 
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man die. Maybe I gits in another argument wid de prison guard -was over¬ 
seer ovah us when we're mikin' on de road. Maybe he hit me wid a whip 
and I splits his head wid a shovel and runs away and files de chain off 
my leg and gits away safe. 
Surely there is little necessity for prolonged analysis of the Negro's posi¬ 
tion in America in ascribing the root of Erutus' propensity to crime to that 
of a society which rejects Ms dignity as a human being to the extent that 
Ms individualism rebels in the only way he knows a fighting back at the 
very authors of his destiny, Society, Environment, rather than natural pro¬ 
pensity or heredity, is, according to O'Neill's Doctrine of Necessity, the 
"prima causa" or the true perpetrators of Brutus' "bias toward evil." His 
sadistic joy in browbeating the natives stems from Ms retaliation for hav¬ 
ing been browbeaten so long himself. His idea of big and little stealing 
was unquestionably an offspring of American politics and economics as seen 
in Ms vindication of his law-breaking proclivities in the island. 
Jones. Ain't I de Emperor? De laws don' go for him. (Judicially) 
You heah what I tells you, Smithers. Dere's stealing like you does. 
For de little stealin' dey gits you in jail soon or late. For the big 
stealin' dey makes you Emperor and puts you in de Hall o' Fame when 
you croaks. (Reminiscently) If dey's one thing I learn in ten years on 
de Pullman ca'g listening to de white quality talk, it's dat same fact, 
and when I gits a chance to use it, I winds up Emperor in two years.2 
This explanation supplies any missing facts we need to support the Doctrine 
of Necessity as being a more powerful determinant in human affairs than 
the intellectual freedom of the will, the pMlosophy to which the "Tragic 
Three" subscribed. Brutus' character was hardened naturally, but it was 
from Necessity with whom Brutus waged no convincing war. Of course choice 
or freedom of the will played an important role in Ms shaping Ms own 
"Tlugene O'Neill, op. cit., p. 11. 
2Ibid., p. 8. 
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destiny, but one can see readily that the evils of segregation, poverty, 
and other ills outside the pale of his control so moulded his character 
that the distinction between good and evil became necessarily blurred. 
Rejection, fear, brutality, and lynching can all produce the sins that ori¬ 
ginate from the "fear which is the basis of our sinful life.” Instead of 
exalting, fear degrades and humiliates him to the extent that 
In a state of fear man generally forgets all about the heights and 
is quite ready to live on the low-lying plain so long as he is safe 
from danger, privations, and sufferings. 
However, it is mystifying to me, up to this point, to fathom clearly the 
implication found in Clark's assertion that "the Negroes' experiences have 
resulted in a type of mind which finds it impossible to escape from its in¬ 
heritance even when given its freedom.The type of mind which the Negroes 
have developed from conditioned experiences is the same type developed by 
any other race in similar circumstances without undue regard to the atavistic 
tendences Clark is attempting to insinuate. These tendencies he seems to 
be referring to are completely overwhelmed by the immediate pressure of the 
present, and not by any remote past as he seems to suggest. While "The 
Emperor Jones" is a "psychological probing of fear" it is not, in my opinion, 
a type of fear produced by "a mind which finds it impossible to escape from 
its inheritance even when given its freedom." It is the word "freedom" and 
its connotation in the controlled environment and circumstances peculiar 
to the Negro which obscures Mr. Clark's revealing analysis of Brutus' fear. 
Freedom that is limited by regimentation and the capriciousness of human 
■^Nicolas Berdyaev, op. cit., p. I7I4., 
2 Barrett H. Clark, op. cit., p. 38. 
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laws is not freedom at all. If freedom, in the sense suggested by Clark, is 
not the result of the laws of God or of Nature, then it is not freedom; it is 
an empty, shallow subterfuge used only by men for their own selfish ends. 
About the laws which created mainly Brutus' fear and evil, Sophocles has this 
to say in his tragedy "Antigone" : 
... it was not Zeus who ordered it 
Nor Justice, dweller with the Nether Gods, 
Gave such a law to men. 1 
Surely it was not God who created the edicts that would condition one segment 
of humanity to indignities that would warp and harden their minds and souls 
to the extent that this hardening of the characters would evolve into a 
species epitomized by Brutus. It was fear all right that drove Brutus out of 
his mind, but it was not the fear engendered in atavistic tendencies. Rather, 
it seems, it was more the fear inherent in the terror of being dominated, brow¬ 
beaten, rejected, humiliated, and deprived of the primal necessities which 
make for human decency. Realizing his helplessness in a world peopled by the 
relentless furies of these fears, Brutus was driven by the compulsion of 
Necessity to his doom that had been impending even before his birth, not in 
the type of mind suggested by Clark, but in the eternal forces of the envi¬ 
ronment predominated by conditioned circumstances of Negro life. 
At the core of this study — YJhether O'Neill's tragedy is a result 
of "conditioned responses on the part of the characters' emotional, spiritual 
and moral immaturity or whether it is a result of chance or fate"2 we 
find "The Iceman Cometh" making an audacious reiteration that up to this 
point in this paper, O'Neill is still obsessed with the idea that man, try 
■^Sophocles, op. cit., p. 109. 
^H. A. Overstreet, The Mature Kind (Nev< York, I9i$), p. 13U» 
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as he might, to deny it, is still the plaything of fate. In this play O'Neill 
is saying that the only -way man can face the fact that life is a losing battle 
is to live by means of pipe dreams or illusions. In other words, it seems, 
he is saying that to face reality is to live in unreality. 
Again we have the main character of this play ascribing to fortuitous 
chance or mischance the events in his early environment that set him off on 
the road to sin. The responsibility for Hickey's tragedy as resultant of 
•what Carlyle in his Sartor Resartus declares that "the universe ... one huge, 
dead immeasurable Steam-engine, rolling on, in its dead indifference to grind 
me from limb to limb"-*- was the cause of his suffering. It was the universe, 
not his own free-will that caused his downfall. 
Hickey's tragedy was due largely to his belated discovery that his 
inner reality was for less palpable than the outward form he forced himself 
to believe. What he saw of himself mirrored in his hopeless drunkenness was 
more than his puny pride could bear. The image of the respectful, outwardly 
successful salesman, (the kind that was not "just liked but well liked as 
as Willy Loman in "The Death of a Salesman" wanted to believe of himself) was 
the one that Hickey wanted to see in his wife's eyes, but he knew that she 
knew him for the weakling that he was. Because Evelyn saw him stripped of all 
his pipe dreams he hated her to the extent of finally murdering her. He tried 
to rationalize the motive for his deed as its being done in order to keep from 
breaking Evelyn's heart  anymore, it seems. However, the real motive, un¬ 
known even to Hickey himself, bursts forth from the deepest recesses of his 
““ ■ ’ - —  —W - ■ 1 ' - _ — .n T • . ' - r ' 1 
^Edward Dims, op. cit«, p. 86. 
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soul and terrorizes him with its violent truth. In an insane ecstasy over 
the fact that at last he is free from Evelyn's patient accusations, Hickey 
blurts out after the murder? 
We 11, you know what you can do with your pipe dreams now, you damned 
bitch'. (He stops with a horrified start, as if shocked out of a night¬ 
mare, as if he couldn't believe he had heard what he had just said,) 
No! I never!-1- 
Hearing these words from his own subconscious magnifies the enormity of the 
truth of his hitherto unacknowledged but deep-seated subterranean struggle 
between the good represented by Evelyn's patient disgust and the evil conse¬ 
quences of his own inability to face life as it really is. He admits to his 
fe How-drunks that 
I know how damn yellow a man can be when it comes to making himself 
face truth ... I know you become such a coward you'll grab at any excuse 
to get out of killing your pipe dreams.2 
When Hickey's fellow habitues of the "Last Chance" saloon try to comfort him 
by their promises to help him get out of jail for Evelyn's murder, one of 
Hickey's last statements before he was led away to jail was 
 Do you suppose I give a damn about life now? Why, you bonehead, 
I haven't got a single damn lying hope or a pipe dream left,3 
Thus the crusading^'evangelical" Hickey at last admits to his comrades in 
disillusioned sin that it is impossible for one to live without even "one 
damned lying hope." His preachments to his fellow drunkards to stop lying 
about themselves and kidding themselves about tomorrow was his own tragic 
catastrophe, because without hope of tomorrow or without one's pipe dreams, 
Hickey knew life was not worth the effort to live. This tragic fate was indeed 
^Eugene O'Neill, "The Iceman Cometh" in Best American Plays, ed. John 
Gassner (New York, 19^2), p. l6Jj. 
2Ibid., p. 150. 
3Ibid,, p. 151. 
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the result of an exacting environment -which had patterned a life incapable 
of enduring the realities* 
If there is any further doubt as to O’Neill's implied explanation 
and placing the responsibility of sin as a concomitant of environment and 
circumstance, then "Desire Under the Elms" should be a most convincing and 
judicious vehicle of substantiation. This play is an excellent example of 
what S. D. Skinner calls "the representation in outward form of the stretch¬ 
ing and tearing of a soul between a will toward good and an appetite for the 
revolt of sin."-^ In "Desire Under the Elms" O'Neill was primarily engrossed 
with those folk whose 
...souls confined in a nutshell may yet be lords of infinite space; 
that spirits cabined and confined by the very fact they have no outlet 
explode finally with greatest spiritual violence.2 
This tragedy deals with human relationships grown intensely taut 
and unbearable because of the enforced intimacy, the primitive lusts, and the 
limitations of the experiences of the characters, whose "spirits were cabined 
and confined" beneath the indomitable rigidity of the Puritan consciousness, 
a recurring theme in almost all of O'Neill's tragedies. It was a natural 
consequence that by virtue of the very confinement of their channeled lives 
these characters would rebel against the impenetrable Puritan suppression of 
the "pagan joy of life" expressed by Abbie in her calculated designs to ensnare 
the moralistic and symbolic Eben. As Eben fights bootlessly against Abbie's 
artful machinations, he is, to me, a symbol of the eternal struggle between 
jjood and evil forces of Plato's "dualism of the soul." Abbie's denial of the 
negative Puritan ideals is shown in her impassioned suggestion to Eben that 
•*-S. D. Skinner, op. cit,, p. 
^Joseph Wood Krutch, "God of the Stump',' The Nation. C^XIX, (November 
26, 1921*), p. £?8. 
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it is impossible to fight the "pagan joy life" even as he vehemently disavows 
his losing struggle. 
Abbie. (softly) Ye don’t mean that, Eben. Ye may think ye mean it, 
mebbe, but ye don't. Ye can't. It's agin nature, Eben. Ye been fightin' 
yer nature ever since the day I come—tryin't'tell yerself I hain’t 
purty t' ye. (...her body squirms desirously—she murmurs languorously) 
...Nature...burnin' inside ye...Nature’U beat ye, Eben. Ye might's 
well own up t’ it fust' last.1 
Eben* s Puritan upbringing had not prepared him properly for such a formidable 
onslaught, but as Abbie had warned him, he could not fight against the forces 
of nature or, as the Greeks called it, "wage war against necessity." As Eben 
is visibly weakening, Abbie taunts and tempts him still further. 
Abbie. (Quite confident now) Ye want me, don't ye? Yes, you dol Look 
at yer eyesi They's lust fur me in 'em burnin* ’em upl Look at yer lips 
now', They's tremblin' an' longin’ t' kiss me, 'n' yer t* bitsi2 
This lascivious flaunting and rejection of Puritan hostility to passion bodes 
only evil in its wake. The hapless Eben promptly succumbs to this pagan joy 
which obscured all of his acquired stigmas to which his environment had 
associated it. Whereas, on the other hand, Ephraim, Eben's cuckolded father 
and husband of the voluptuous Abbie, represents the whole forbidding New 
England consciousness in his instinctive sensing that there is something amiss 
and sinful going on in his house. He says "They's no peace in houses, they's 
no rest livin’ with folks. Somethin' always livin' with ye." This "somethin' 
that Ephraim felt "droopin' off the elums, climbin' up the roof, sneakin’ down 
the chimneys, pokin’ in the comers"3 soon had its devastating effects on all 
their lives. In trying to convince Eben that it was only he whom she truly 
loves and not for gain of the farm nor their illegitimate baby, Abbie is 
Eugene O'Neill, op. cit,, p. 189. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 192. 
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driven to murdering their child in her frantic effort to hold Eben's love, 
•which by now had completely subdued any sense of guilt between them. Their 
passion was destined to end in tragedy because it was "so long restrained 
by the sense of sin," a sin that was accentuated by the eternal battle 
between good and evil. 
When Abbie and her illicit step-son lover Eben have been led away 
to placate the ever-present retributive forces, Cabot, lonely, indestructible, 
and adamantine as the rock-bound New England soil he worships and represents, 
in typical fashion, comforts himself by saying "that God is lonesome, hain't 
he? God's hard an* lonesome." Moreover, with the characteristic impregna¬ 
bility of his Puritan inheritance, he turns resolutely to his chores, a 
compelling proof of O'Neill's belief in the impossibility of ever escaping 
the intractable laws of heredity and environment as the accounting force in 
man’s "bias toward evil." 
That O'Neill’s quest for a workable solution of the problem of evil 
in man's relations to God was uppermost in his mind is attested to by the 
plays which depict the conflicts and suffering sustained by an abnegation of 
life in "its entirety," As O'Neill himself has said the acceptance of life 
in'its entirety is the only true life." When the two opposing battles of 
accepting and coping with reality on the one hand and "Christian masochism, 
the "hypermoralism of Puritanism," the inexorable finality is sin and suffer- 
1 mg. 
According to Engel, "The Great God Brown" symbolizes, in the first 
•'•Edwin A. Engle, op. cit., p. 16;?. 
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place, "the conflict between O'Neill’s aesthetic and religious impulses, be¬ 
tween unfettered creativity and Catholic faith, not Calvinistic faithj and 
...his sense of isolation in an antagonistic bourgeois culture."^ It was 
very early in Dion's life that he learned that it was to no avail to fight 
the forces of reality immanent in Puritan society," the extraverted, acquisi¬ 
tive society" in which he lived. To expose the deepest desires of his soul, 
the only reality to him, would be to exile himself from the actualities inher¬ 
ent in the externalities of the Puritan society which moulded his thinking. 
To safeguard for a while the exquisite tortures of love, Dion knew that he 
would have to acquiesce to the more insistent demands of "confrontation" which 
Dr. Sherrill says is a "time of decision as between advancing into growth or 
shrinking back from its perils."2 
Dion, the typical example of the frustrated individual destroyed by 
Puritan ideals, recognized his helplessness if he antagonized the Puritan 
"status quo." His confrontation is encompassed in his decision to forego 
the reality of his soul for the externalities of the society in which he lives. 
Now that Dion knows that his real self will of necessity be lived behind the 
mask of Puritan acceptance, he invokes some unknown spirit to buttress him in 
this decision: 
Cornel Rest'. Relaxl Let go your clutch on the world1.... Wake up! 
Time to get up'. Time for school'. Time to le a ml learn to pretendl 
Cover your nakedness'. learn to lie'. Learn to keep stepl Join the 
procession *.3 
Dion's unheroic capitulation to the great god "Success" and conformity shows 
again that the importance of the Doctrine of Necessity is a reckoning force 
Jlbid., p. 165. 
2Lewis J. Sherrill, op. cit., p. ll*. 
3Eugene O'Neill, op. cit., p. 3lS« 
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of undeniable consequence in the lives of men -whose "hapless wills" are un¬ 
able to requite the struggle. 
Dion's unwilling disavowal of the creative urge in him had its dire 
reverberations in his being forced by the Doctrine of Necessity to retreat 
into the cynicism and "Satanism" of the very ideals which he so thoroughly 
hated. His adjurgation of his own personality to conform to that of his 
environment robbed him of the fruits of the materialism he was forced to 
accept. Retreating into drunkenness, perrimism, and "virtuous infidelity" 
took its toll of the mundane rewards his family hoped to reap. By this time, 
all of the credit for his creativeness had been usurped by his "friend" 
William Brown, who had always coveted every seeming blessing Dion possessed. 
As Dion recognizes this turn of affairs he speakss 
Dion, (widly mocking) They've been accepted—Mr. Brown’s designs. 
My designs reallyi You don't need to be told thatl He hands me one 
mathematically correct barn after another, and I doctor them up with 
cute allurements so that fools will desire to buy, sell, breed, sleep, 
love, hate, curse, and pray in them! I do this with devilish clever¬ 
ness to their entire delight'. Once I dreamed of painting wind on the 
sea and skimming flight of a cloud shadows over the tops of treesi Now 
...(He laughs) but pride is sin.-^- 
Dion's coercive immolation to the gods of success and environment 
is nearly complete at this time. The "stretching and tearing of his soul" 
between the creativity of his inner urges and the appeasing of the "Great 
God Necessity" has just about consumed any vestige of a will to live he has 
left. His sense of isolation and his desperate loneliness in an alien uni¬ 
verse are suggested in the next passage in which he sees only utter defeat 
in this world of "Christian masochism?" 
1Ibid., p. 338 
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Dion, (like a priest, offering up prayer for the dying) Quickly must 
thou be gone from hence, see how matters stand with thee. Ah, fool, 
learn now to die to the world that thou mayst begin to live with Christ... 
Keen thyself a pilgrim, and a stranger upon earth, to whom the affairs 
of this world do not belong. Keep thy heart free and raised upwards 
toward God because thou hast not here a lasting abode...Peace, poor tor¬ 
tured one, brave, pitiful pride of man, the hour of deliverance comes.1 
At last Dion is reconciled to the bitter fact that neither drunken¬ 
ness, cynicism, Satanism, love, nor the sympathetic understanding and pro¬ 
tection by Cybel can save him from the consequences of his denouncing the "God- 
creature of his own reality for the God-creature of the Puritan one, expressed 
in the "acquisitive, and extraverted society" emblematic of the Western world. 
Just as O'Neill implied in the Doctrine of Necessity, the forces of environment 
are calculating and remorseless in their exacting demands of their victims 
who have the temerity to dare to grapple with the problem of life. 
Dion's prior acceptance of conventionality had been so convincing 
that the covetuous Brown, Dion's inferior in every aspect of individualism, 
was shaken into disbelief upon discovering the real Dion only in death. Yet, 
his ineffable envy of Dion's apparent successes—his beautiful wife, his 
talented children, his indisputable genius, and even his paramour—were so 
intense that he assumed all of Dion's surface worldliness after his death. 
Finally wracked by pain and pangs of guilt, Brown is troubled and eventually 
annihilated by the same hostile elements which crucified Dion. Thus Brown's 
ineffectual attempt to try to become other than that which in reality he was 
resolved naturally in his being wholly disintegrated in both mind and spirit. 
Eefore Brown was destroyed by the forces of Necessity, he, too, 
1Ibid., p. 338. 
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suggests O'Neill's personal bewilderment, at securing some sort of reconci¬ 
liation with God. "When Brown realized that his world and his destiny were 
closing in on him, he automatically called upon God: 
Brown. Mercy, Compassionate Savior of Man’. Out of my depths I cry to 
you*. Mercy on thy poor clod, thy clod of unhallowed earth, the clay, the 
Great God Brown'. Mercy, Savior', (He seems to wait for an answer—leaping 
to his feet he puts out his hand to touch the mask like a frightened child 
reaching out for its nurse's hand—then with immediate mocking despair) 
Bahi I am sorry, little children, but your kingdom is empty, God has 
become disgusted and moved away to some far ecstatic star where life is a 
dancing flame.l 
That O'Neill has not found reconciliation in man's relation to God is evident, 
I believe, in those last skeptical lines. Man is still groping blindly in 
a hostile world in which he is left more or less to his own devices to find 
peace and meaning and then ultimately to die, a victim of circumstances over 
which he had no control. 
1Ibid., p. 371. 
SUMMARY 
The post-war temper of fifth century Greece was to the ’’Tragic Three" 
—Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides — what the post-war temper of the 
twentieth century was to Eugene O’Neill. The aftermath of both the Pelopon¬ 
nesian War and World War I deepened the impression of a disintegrating cul¬ 
ture. Disturbed by the dissolution of the old aristocratic regimes and the 
ancestral faith of Greece and the "genteel tradition" of the Americans, jerked 
out of the complacent moulds of wanted custom, and shaken by the rise of 
hitherto unimagined spiritual and moral forces, the noble Greeks and O’Neill 
were deeply sensitive to the fact that the collapse of their respective 
societies was merely the "outward and tangible indication" of the inherent 
demoralization of the individual character. 
Oddly enough, the Western view of man's predicament in a disintegrat¬ 
ing society as represented by O'Neill’s philosophy of the Doctrine of Necessity 
approximates in many ways the Greek view affirmed in this study by the incom¬ 
parable "Tragic Three" in their ideas on man's sovereignty of the will. As 
the Greek tragedians and O'Neill viewed the hopeless misery and suffering of 
humanity, especially the innocent, they were profoundly distressed as to the 
causes of evil and suffering. 
Both views of man's predicament in a hostile universe recognize the 
fact that even while man who by his spirit is king of the universe, he is 
still powerless to find harmony and meaning in his overwhelming propensity 
and "bias toward evil." In searching for an answer to the question "Why does 
God send suffering into the world?" the Greeks placed the blame upon the 
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individual's freedom of the -will as shown in the chorus' song in Aeschylus' 
"Eumenides" that 
He who of his free will 
Doth righteousness, shall still 
Be blest: no surge of ill 
Shall whelm him under.1 
and in the same play the idea is expressed in this way: 
But he whose will is set against the gods, 
Who treads beyond the law with foot impure 
Till o'er the wreck of Right confusion broods, — 
Know that for him, though now he sail secure 
The day of storm shall be.^ 
On the other hand, O'Neill viewed man as a victim of circumstance, 
environment, and heredity based predominantly upon the "extraverted, acquisi¬ 
tive" society inherent in the Puritan traditions and conventions which by 
force of necessity alienated man's possibility of ever attaining harmony and 
purpose in existence. Moreover, this same alienation developed man's "bias 
toward evil," causing O'Neill to reach the same conclusion as the Greeks that 
"man's wishes, hopes, and aims find no response   no, not even an echo in 
the rest of the universe, and that the best fate for a human being is never 
to have been born into a world that for him is meaningless and merciless.^ 
Chapter one discusses the problem of responsibility from the pre- 
Christian or Greek view in which we find expressed in the tragedies of 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides the philosophy that the tragedy of mortals 
is a tragedy of fate, based upon the interpretation of the cosmic life of 
man as being completely self contained by virtue of his superiority and 
creativeness^ making him free of all other masters except himself. The Greek 
^Aeschylus, op. cit., p. 81*. 
^Aeschylus, op. cit., p. 290. 
3ArnoId Toynbee, op. cit., p, 3» 
^Nicolas Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 30. 
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world was full of gods but there was no super cosmic God to whom the inno¬ 
cent sufferer or one who had overstepped the bounds of propriety could ul¬ 
timately appeal because the gods themselves were subject to the mysterious 
compulsion of "moira" or fate as is attested to by the chorus in Aeschylus’ 
”Agamemnon.” 
Yet — did not a Fate, from old 
Established supreme, restrain 
Even Gods, that they cannot mould 
Always the doom they ordain.1 
Since the gods could not rise above the cycle of cosmic life, the 
Greeks' pessimism as shown in this study finds no solution in the contradic¬ 
tory freedom of the will, their only way out being through the ecstasy of 
hopeless suffering by "waiting andwailing in anguish of soul, in despair 
of unknitting the links of the chains that drag men to their destiny." The 
convergence of both Greek thought and that of O' Neill is inextricably en¬ 
twined in the thought that there is no satisfactory answering the question 
as to the origin of evil and suffering because it exists, it is, and that 
is all. Placing the responsibility for sin does rot preclude man's in¬ 
evitable bias toward evil; therefore, as is related in Sophocles' "Antigone," 
And of no mortal say 
"That man is happy," till 
Vexed by no grievous ill 
He passes life’s goal. 
Chapter two is devoted exclusively to the modern view of man as 
expressed in the philosophy of Eugene O'Neill whose own life and the pecu¬ 
liar law of his nature permitted him to search the penetralia of the soul 
•'"Aeschylus, op. cit., p. 25. 
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with a perspicacity not often alloted to "mere mortals," these creatures of 
a day who have their hour upon the stage and then are heard no more. As 
Yank says to the policeman who asks him what his reason is for wanting to 
be put in a cage. "Enuf to gimme life fori I was born, see'. Sure, dat's 
de charge. Trite it in the blotter. I was born, get me." This speech as 
we see, reechoes the Greek view that the best fate for a human being is 
never to have been bom. And in "The Strange Interlude" he reaffirms this 
same pessimistic view of life as Mrs. Evans discusses the nebulous and illu¬ 
sory element of peace and happiness* Mrs. Evans. (Sardonically) "There’s 
peace in the green fields of Eden, they sayl You got to die to find that 
outl" Since O'Neill’s insatiable spirit did not discover to his satisfac¬ 
tion plausible responses to the esoteric musing of human existence, this 
view of life is understandable. 
In his soul-probing attempts to find purpose and meaning in "this 
unintelligible world" and in seeking to place the responsibility for the 
presence of so much evil therein, O'Neill was somewhat convinced that it 
was the Doctrine of Necessity which was the primary source of human ills. 
However, man was not entirely devoid of his burden of the responsibility 
for, as we perceive in his plays, he believed in a moral order which could 
not be violated without retributive consequences. As can be ascertained 
from the tragic resolutions extracted from his works, O'Neill's "success in 
interpreting universal human experiences in terms of the draina"^ was no ac¬ 
cident, but it was the soul-searching effort to write of life and Truth as 
■'"Horst Frenz, American Drama and World Drama (New York, I9I4O) 
p. 231, 
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he saw it. In his own words he said that "It is just life that interests 
me as a thing itself."-*- 
^Barrett H. Clark, op. cit., p. 37. 
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